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HICKS V. DOWD: THE END OF PERPETUITY?
C. Timothy Lindstrom*

I. INTRODUCTION
This article examines the improper1 termination or modiﬁcation of conservation easements. It does so by (i) examining the termination of a conservation
easement by Johnson County, Wyoming, dealt with in the recent Wyoming case
of Hicks v. Dowd,2 which is a case of ﬁrst impression in the United States; (ii)
overviewing the common and statutory law pertaining to conservation easements
in the United States and in Wyoming, including existing common and statutory
law restraints on improper easement termination or modiﬁcation; (iii) reviewing
the doctrine of cy pres and its possible application to, and implications for,
conservation easements; (iv) reconsidering the Hicks case in the light of existing
common and statutory law remedies for improper easement termination, and
in the light of the cy pres doctrine; and (v) comparing the results, and making
a recommendation for an alternative to application of the cy pres doctrine to
conservation easements.

* C. Timothy Lindstrom holds degrees in law and planning from the University of Virginia. He
taught zoning and planning law at the University of Virginia School of Architecture from 1979 until
1998. He was in private law practice in Charlottesville until 1989 when he became staff attorney
to the Piedmont Environmental Council where he served until 1998. He has written and lectured
extensively on topics of planning law and the law (including tax law) relating to conservation
easements. He helped author the American Farm and Ranch Protection Act, which increased the
federal tax incentives for the donation of conservation easements, and he lead a successful sevenyear, nationwide legislative effort for its enactment. He also worked extensively with the Virginia
General Assembly regarding zoning legislation and helped to draft new Virginia laws increasing the
tax incentives in Virginia for the donation of conservation easements.
1

For purposes of this article, the “improper” termination or modiﬁcation of a conservation
easement is intended to refer to those terminations or modiﬁcations that confer a net ﬁnancial
beneﬁt on a private person or entity and/or fail to meaningfully advance land conservation on the
protected property or some other property in the vicinity of the protected property.
2

Hicks v. Dowd, 157 P.3d 914, 2007 WY 74 (Wyo. 2007).
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While the Hicks decision may be one of ﬁrst impression, it comes at a time
of increasingly intense debate nationally among academics and practitioners
regarding whether, and how, a conservation easement could (or should) be
terminated or modiﬁed.3 The rapid growth of land protected by private land
trusts4 in Wyoming through the use of conservation easements5 makes it likely
that the termination and modiﬁcation of conservation easements will become
a legal issue confronted increasingly by practitioners. This is particularly true
given the aging of conservation easements and the turnover in ownership of lands
subject to conservation easements.6
As the cache of conservation easements in this country continues
to grow, and as those easements, the vast majority of which are
perpetual, begin to age, it will become increasingly important
to determine whether, when, and how easements that no
longer accomplish their intended conservation purposes can be
modiﬁed or terminated.7

3

Easement termination is a rare occurrence. Easement modiﬁcation (amendment) is a
relatively common occurrence, as discussed infra, at notes 70–97 (and accompanying text). There
are, generally speaking, many justiﬁable and important reasons for easement modiﬁcation. However,
easement termination is a different matter.
4
A “land trust” is typically a not-for-proﬁt corporation recognized as a public charity (a
“publicly supported organization”) under §501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as
amended, whose purpose is land conservation. As described, a land trust is a qualiﬁed “holder” of
conservation easements under WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34-1-201(b)(ii)(B) (2007) as follows:

‘Holder’ means:
(A) A governmental body empowered to hold an interest in real property under the
laws of this state or the United States; or
(B) A charitable corporation, charitable association or charitable trust, a primary
purpose or power of which includes retaining or protecting the natural, scenic
or open space values of real property, assuring the availability of real property for
agricultural, forest, recreational or open space use, protecting natural resources,
maintaining or enhancing air or water quality, or preserving the historical,
architectural, archeological or cultural aspects of real property.
5
According to the “2005 National Land Trust Census” prepared by the Land Trust Alliance
(a national umbrella organization for land trusts), the number of acres protected by land trusts
(excluding land protected by government agencies) in Wyoming increased by 159% between 2000
and 2005, to a total acreage protected privately in 2005 of 105,760 acres, of which 49,358 acres
were protected by conservation easements. The total number of acres protected by private land
trusts nationally in 2005 was reported by the census to be 11,890,109 of which 6,245,969 acres
were protected by conservation easements. 2005 National Land Trust Census, published by the
Land Trust Alliance.
6

For example, the ﬁrst conservation easement in Wyoming was granted in 1978 to The Nature
Conservancy on a several hundred-acre tract of land along Wyoming Highway 22 in Teton County.
The land subject to this easement has changed hands twice since 1978 and is now again on the
market.
7
Nancy A. McLaughlin, Rethinking the Perpetual Nature of Conservation Easements, 29 HAV’D
ENVT’L L. REV., 422, 424 (2005).
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Using the Hicks case as a starting point, it is the general purpose of this
article to provide a legal, factual, and practical basis for the future evaluation of
conservation easement termination and modiﬁcation.

II. HICKS V. DOWD
A. Factual Background
On August 6, 2002, the Board of County Commissioners of Johnson County,
Wyoming (“Board”) adopted “Resolution 257.”8 Resolution 257 authorized
the Board to execute a quit-claim deed to Fred and Linda Dowd, owners of an
approximately 1,043-acre ranch (referred to by the Court, and in this article, as
the “Meadowood Ranch”) lying along Clear Creek outside of the Town of Buffalo,
in Johnson County.9 The deed did two things. It conveyed a one-acre parcel of
land (“One-Acre Tract”) adjoining Meadowood Ranch to the Dowds, and it
released a conservation easement (“Meadowood Easement”) over the Ranch held
by the Johnson County Scenic Preserve Trust (“Trust”).10 This Resolution and the
actions taken pursuant to the Resolution appear unique in the United States.11
The Meadowood Easement had been granted to the Board in 1993 by an
instrument titled “Deed of Conservation Easement and Quitclaim Deed.” The
grantor of the Meadowood Easement was the Lowham Limited Partnership. The
Meadowood Easement followed a format used in Wyoming prior to the enactment
of the Wyoming Uniform Conservation Easement Act (the “WYUCEA”) in
2005.12 The format was one in which a parcel of land (in this case the One-Acre
Tract) was conveyed in fee to the prospective easement holder followed by the
conveyance of the conservation easement, which was conveyed as an appurtenance
to the fee parcel.13 The reason for this format was the lack of formal enabling
authority for conservation easements in Wyoming, see footnote, infra and related
text.14
8

Hicks v. Dowd, 157 P.3d 914, 917, 2007 WY 74, ¶9 (Wyo. 2007).

9

Id. at 915, 917.

10

Id. at 917.

11

No reported cases can be found in which a conservation easement was terminated voluntarily
by the holder without payment of valuable consideration (although the Dowds contended that
the indemniﬁcation provided by them as part of the conveyance and termination was valuable
consideration).
12

WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-1-201-207 (2007).

13

For example, paragraph 10 of the Deed and Easement provided: “Appurtenant. The Easement
granted herein is appurtenant to the real estate, described above at note 3 (and accompanying text),
conveyed to Grantee contemporaneously with the conveyance of this Easement.”
14
See also Michael R. Eitel, Wyoming’s Trepidation Toward Conservation Easement Legislation: A
Look at Two Issues Troubling the Wyoming State Legislature, 4 WYO. L. REV. 57 (2004); C. Timothy
Lindstrom, Income Tax Aspects of Conservation Easements, 5 WYO. L. REV. 1 (2005), for descriptions
of Wyoming’s method of conservation easement conveyance prior to enactment of the WYUCEA.
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The Meadowood Easement was intended to protect the natural resources of
Meadowood Ranch.15 The parties to the Meadowood Easement expressly intended
its provisions to apply to the Ranch in perpetuity.16 Among other prohibited
activities, the Meadowood Easement prohibited mining and the removal of
minerals from the Ranch.17 In the event that Johnson County as Grantee could
not carry out the purposes of the Meadowood Easement, the Meadowood
Easement provided that it could be assigned pursuant to the doctrine of cy pres.18
Furthermore, if, due to “unforeseeable circumstances,” a court determined that
the continuation of the Meadowood Easement was impossible and could not
be “reformed” to substantially accomplish its purposes, then the Meadowood
Easment provided that, with the approval of a court, “may transfer their respective
interests in the Ranch” provided that any proceeds were distributed as provided
for in the Treasury Regulations governing conservation easements.19

15

The purpose of the Easement conveyed by the Deed and Easement was described in
paragraph 1 of the Deed and Easement as follows: “Purpose. It is the purpose of this Easement to
preserve and protect in perpetuity the natural, agricultural, ecological, wildlife habitat, open space,
scenic and aesthetic features and values of the Ranch.”
16
Paragraph 5 of the “Background” of the Easement expressed Johnson County’s intention to
carry out the intentions of the Grantor in perpetuity as follows:

The Grantee has the resources to carry out its responsibilities hereunder, intends,
by acceptance of the grant made hereby, forever to honor the intentions of the
Grantor stated herein to preserve and protect in perpetuity the natural elements
and ecological and aesthetic values of the Ranch, and further intends to enforce the
terms of this instrument.
The Easement further provided in paragraph 10 of the “Conveyance of Conservation Easement”
as follows: “This Easement shall be a burden upon and shall run with the Ranch in perpetuity and
shall bind the Grantor and its successors and assigns forever.”
17

Paragraph 5 of the “Conveyance of Conservation Easement” provided:
Prohibited Uses and Practices. The following uses and practices are inconsistent
with the purposes of this Easement and shall be prohibited upon or within the
Ranch:
...
(d) The ﬁlling, excavating, dredging, mining or drilling, removal of minerals,
hydrocarbons, and other materials on or below the surface of the land . . . .

18

Paragraph 9(a) of the “Conveyance of Conservation Easement” provided:
Assignment of Grantee’s Interests. (a) . . . If Grantee dissolves, becomes insolvent,
ceases to exist as a ‘qualiﬁed organization,’ or for any other reason becomes unable
to enforce effectively the conservation purposes of this Easement then Grantee shall
be required to assign its interest in the Easement to a ‘qualiﬁed organization,’ and if
such Grantee is unable to so transfer the Easement, the Easement shall be transferred
to such ‘qualiﬁed organization’ as a court of competent jurisdiction applying the
doctrine of cy pres, or analogous principles shall determine.

For a description of the doctrine of cy pres see infra notes 146–70 (and accompanying text).
19

Paragraph 9(b) of the “Conveyance of Conservation Easement” provided:
(b) The Grantor wishes to express again its intent that this Easement be maintained
in perpetuity for the purposes expressed herein. However, if due to unforeseeable
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Six years after contributing the Meadowood Easement, the Lowham Limited
Partnership conveyed Meadowood Ranch to Fred and Linda Dowd.20 The
conveyance provided that it was
Subject to all prior easements, reservations, restrictions and
exceptions of record, including but not limited to that certain
Deed of Conservation Easement and Quitclaim Deed granted
by the Board of County Commissioners of Johnson County,
Wyoming by instrument recorded December 29, 1993 in Book
86A-41 of Miscellaneous, Page 672, of the Johnson County,
Wyoming records.21
According to the Appellees’ Brief ﬁled with the Wyoming Supreme Court
in the Hicks case, Paul Lowham assured the Dowds at the time of the sale of the
Ranch that “there would be no mineral activity on the ranch and that Lowham
had a study done which showed that the probability of surface disturbing mineral
activities were so remote as to be negligible.”22 Such a study would typically be done
as part of the “due diligence” prior to the conveyance of a conservation easement
to insure that the easement complied with federal tax code provisions governing
the deductibility of conservation easement contributions.23 Nevertheless, at the
time of the conveyance of the conservation easement (and the conveyance to the
Dowds) Northwest Energy held title to the subsurface minerals on the Ranch.24
On April 15, 1997, prior to the conveyance to the Dowds, the Meadowood
Easement was assigned by the Board to the Trust. The Trust was established
pursuant to Resolution 145 adopted by the Commissioners and effective

circumstances a ﬁnal binding non-appealable judicial determination is made that
continuation of this Easement is impossible, or if such determination renders
the continuation of the Easement impossible (e.g. pursuant to a condemnation
proceeding), and if a judicial determination is made that the Easement cannot
be so reformed as to accomplish substantial compliance with the purposes of this
Easement, then Grantor and Grantee, with the approval of the Court, may agree
to transfer their respective interests in the Ranch, provided that Grantee shall be
entitled to such proceeds from the transfer as provided for in Treasury regulation
section 1.170A-14(g)(6)(ii), as amended, to the extent that regulation applies to
this transaction.
Note how closely this provision of the Meadowood Easement follows the operation of the doctrine
of cy pres cited, infra note 154.
20

Hicks, 157 P.3d at 915–17, 2007 WY 74, at ¶9.

21

Warranty Deed ﬁled in the Johnson County, Wyoming records 2/2/99 in Book 87A,
beginning at page 293.
22

Brief of Appellees, page 62, ﬁled with the Wyoming Supreme Court in Appeal No. 06-02.

23

See 26 C.F.R. §1.170A-14(g)(4)(ii) (2007).

24

Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support
of Plaintiff ’s Motion for Summary Judgment ﬁled in Civil Action No. 2003-0057, at 17.
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December 21, 1993.25 According to Paul Lowham, the Trust had been initiated
by him with Johnson County in 1993 for the express purpose of holding the
Meadowood Easement. However, the Trust was not ready by the end of 1993 and
so the Meadowood Easement was conveyed directly to Johnson County which,
under federal tax law, was qualiﬁed to hold deductible conservation easements.26
According to Lowham, the Trust did not actually achieve its tax-exempt status
under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code (the “Code”) (such status is
required for a non-governmental organization to hold deductible conservation
easements) until 1997.27
In 2001 coal bed methane development was proposed on the Ranch28 by
Northwest Energy. In June of 2002 the Dowds requested that the Board terminate
the Meadowood Easement on the grounds that “coal bed methane development
was unpreventable, unanticipated, and inconsistent with” the Meadowood
Easement. The Dowds proposed to the County that they buy29 back the OneAcre Tract and the Meadowood Easement.30 As of August 6, 2002, when the
Board terminated the Meadowood Easement, Northwest Energy had two wells
located on the Ranch occupying slightly less than one acre.31
As previously described, in response to the Dowd’s request the Board adopted
Resolution 257,32 pursuant to which it re-conveyed the One-Acre Tract to the
25

Hicks, 157 P.3d at 916, 2007 WY 74, at ¶6.

26

See 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-14(c)(i) (recognizing governmental agencies as qualiﬁed to hold
deductible conservation easements).
27

Afﬁdavit of Paul Lowham ﬁled in Civil Action No. 2003-0057 (Hicks v. Dowd).

28

Hicks, 157 P.3d at 916–17, 2007 WY 74, at ¶8.

29

There is no evidence, however, that Dowds paid anything other than the $10.00 consideration
represented in the deed and the indemniﬁcation they offered to the County.
30

Hicks, 157 P.3d at 917, 2007 WY 74, at ¶8.

31

Afﬁdavit of Kenneth M. Quinn, General Manager of Northwest Energy, ﬁled in Civil Action
No. 2003-0057 (Hicks v. Dowd).
32

The Resolution stated, in pertinent part, as follows:
WHEREAS, the mining, drilling or removal of minerals or hydrocarbons on or
below the surface of the Surface Lands was to be prohibited by the Conservation
Easement (Conservation Easement Paragraph 5(d), and
WHEREAS, the mineral rights associated with the Surface Lands were severed
from the Surface Lands prior to grant of the Conservation Easement to the Board
and therefore the mineral rights and associated access rights (“Dominant Mineral
Rights”) were not and are not subject to the Conservation Easement, and
WHEREAS, coalbed methane development was unknown, unforeseen and
unanticipated on the Surface Lands at the time the Conservation Easement was
conveyed to the Board in 1993, and
WHEREAS, due to changes in technology, unforeseen coalbed methane development,
incident to the Dominant Mineral Rights, has occurred and is occurring on the
Surface Lands, and
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Dowds and terminated the Meadowood Easement in exchange for the Dowd’s
agreement to indemnify the Board.33

B. Procedural Background
On July 14, 2003, ten months after the Board’s action, Robert Hicks, et al,
ﬁled Civil Action No. 2003-0057 in the District Court for the Fourth Judicial
District, Johnson County (the “District Court”), naming the Dowds and the Board
as defendants. The suit alleged (1) that the Board’s violation of the Wyoming
Public Meetings Act on grounds that the Board’s action was not preceded by the
required public notice, which violation allegedly rendered the conveyance to the
Dowds void; (2) that termination of the Meadowood Easement could only occur
after a judicial determination that continuation of the Meadowood Easement
was impossible, failing which the conveyance to the Dowds allegedly breached
the Meadowood Easement; (3) that the Board breached its ﬁduciary duty to only
transfer its assets for “a reasonable and prudent sum of money;” and (4) that
the Meadowood Easement required payment of a speciﬁed percentage of the
proceeds of any sale of the Ranch in the event that the Meadowood Easement was
extinguished.34
The remedies sought by Hicks included (1) a declaration that the conveyance
was void; (2) issuance of a writ of mandamus directing the Board to rescind the
conveyance; (3) judgment against the Trust equal to the fair market value of the
One-Acre Tract and the value of the Meadowood Easement; and (4) imposition of
a constructive trust upon Meadowood Ranch to secure the value of the Meadowood
Easement, such value to be as determined pursuant to § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(ii) of
the Treasury Regulations (the “Regulations”) (governing distribution of proceeds
of the sale of land subject to a conservation easement in the event of termination
of the easement).35

WHEREAS, the coalbed methane development, which is not subject to the
Conservation Easement, is and will be in the future inconsistent with the purposes
of the Conservation Easement, makes enforcement of the Conservation Easement
impossible as to the coalbed methane development and exposes the Board to liability
under the terms of the Conservation Easement, and
WHEREAS, Fred L. Dowd and Linda S. Dowd have agreed to indemnify and hold
harmless the Board and the County from all liability, claims and causes of action,
including reasonable costs and attorneys fees, that arise out of or by virtue of transfer
of the One Acre Tract and Conservation Easement to them . . . .
33

Hicks, 157 P.3d at 917, 2007 WY 74, at ¶9.

34

“Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Mandamus Relief, Breach of Fiduciary Duties and
Constructive Trust” ﬁled by Hicks, et al, in Civil Action No. 2003-0057 (Hicks v. Dowd).
35

Id.
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Defendants’ answers alleged that plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the suit.
Defendants soon thereafter ﬁled a Motion for Summary Judgment.36 Plaintiffs
responded with their own Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing, among other
things that they had standing “because this matter involves issues of substantial
public interest and importance.”37
On April 14, 2004, the district court denied both Motions and ruled as follows:
(1) that the conservation easement was transferred to a charitable trust; (2) that
under W.S. § 4-10-103, a beneﬁciary of such a trust would include any person
with a present or future beneﬁcial interest in the trust, including all Wyoming
citizens, of which Robert Hicks was one; (3) that under Title 4 of the Wyoming
Statutes, district courts have exclusive jurisdiction concerning the administration
of charitable trusts and that no appeal is required by the Wyoming Administrative
Procedures Act before seeking judicial resolution of controversies concerning
charitable trusts; (4) that W.S. § 4-10-110 recognizes that the Wyoming Attorney
General has the right to act as a beneﬁciary with respect to charitable trusts; (5)
that there was no violation of the Wyoming Open Meetings Act; and (6) that the
propriety of the County’s transfer of the One-Acre Tract and termination of the
Meadowood Easement is an issue for resolution by the district court.38
The district court ordered the parties to notify the Wyoming Attorney General
of the suit and seek his assistance.39 The Attorney General responded that
The Attorney General’s Ofﬁce does not need to intervene in this
matter. The issues are squarely before the Court and the interests
of the public, as beneﬁciaries of the conservation easement at
issue here, are being represented by arguments of counsel on all
sides.40
After the case was set for trial, Dowds ﬁled an additional Motion to Dismiss
the remaining claims in the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on grounds
that the plaintiffs had failed to ﬁle a petition for review of agency action under
Wyoming Rule of Appellate Procedure (“W.R.A.P.”) 12. In a telephonic hearing
the district court agreed with the Dowds and subsequently entered an order
dismissing plaintiffs’ remaining claims. The district court’s order essentially
reversed its earlier ruling and found that the conveyance to the Dowds by the

36

Hicks, 157 P.3d at 917, 2007 WY 74, at ¶13.

37

Id.

38

“Order Denying Motions for Summary Judgment” entered in Civil Action 2003-0057
(Hicks v. Dowd), April 12, 2004.
39

Id.

40

See Hicks, 157 P.3d at 918, 2007 WY 74, at ¶15 (quoting from letter of Wyoming Attorney
General Pat Crank dated May 3, 2004).
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County was “agency action,” any challenge to which was governed by W.R.A.P.
12 requiring ﬁling of an appeal within thirty days of the action. The district
court found that the plaintiffs’ failure to timely ﬁle the appeal deprived it of any
jurisdiction in the case.41 Plaintiffs appealed the district court’s decision to the
Wyoming Supreme Court and the decision was rendered May 9, 2007.

C. The Supreme Court Ruling
The Wyoming Supreme Court upheld the district court’s ruling dismissing
the action, but rejected the district court’s decision that it lacked jurisdiction
because plaintiffs failed to timely ﬁle an appeal under W.R.A.P. 12.42 In essence,
the Supreme Court’s ruling boiled down to the following: (1) Because neither
party challenged the district court’s ﬁnding that the Trust was a charitable trust, the
Supreme Court accepted that the Trust was a charitable trust and that Appellant’s
action was one to enforce the Trust43; (2) applying charitable trust rules, and
based upon its review of common law and the Wyoming Uniform Trust Code
relating to charitable trusts, the Court found that plaintiffs lacked standing to
enforce the charitable trust created by conveyance of the Meadowood Easement;44
and (3) because the Attorney General’s determination not to participate in the
suit was based upon the district court’s ruling that plaintiffs did have standing,
the Supreme Court invited the Attorney General to reassess his position not to
participate in the case.45
Given the national controversy over conservation easement termination and
modiﬁcation, it seems likely that someone, somewhere, will misconstrue this
decision as (1) applying the charitable trust doctrine as a matter of law governing
all conservation easements in Wyoming, and/or (2) sanctioning the termination
of conservation easements in Wyoming.
The decision really does neither. First, as a matter of Wyoming law “unspeciﬁed
errors will not be considered” by the Wyoming Supreme Court on appeal.46
Therefore, because neither party challenged the district court’s determination that
the Trust was a charitable trust and that Trust actions were governed by charitable
trust rules, the Supreme Court merely accepted the district court’s determination
regarding these important legal principles as the law of the case. How the Supreme
41

“Order Dismissing Remaining Claims for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction” entered in
Civil Action 2003-0057 (Hicks v. Dowd) October 11, 2005.
42

Hicks, 157 P.3d at 918–19, 2007 WY 74, at ¶17.

43

See id. at 919; “Given the district court’s unchallenged ﬁnding, we must agree that the Scenic
Preserve Trust is a charitable trust.”
44

Id. at 919.

45

Id. at 921.

46

See generally Alleman v. Alleman, 319 P.2d 871, 873, 78 Wyo. 135, 142 (Wyo. 1958);
Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co, et al, v. Lapman, 104 P. 533, 536, 18 Wyo. 106 (Wyo. 1909).
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Court might rule had the Trust’s status as a charitable trust been challenged is
unknown. However, had the Supreme Court found the district court’s ruling on
these points clearly erroneous, it could have addressed that part of the district
court’s ruling even if the matter had not been raised on appeal. 47
Furthermore, the Court could easily have disposed of the case by afﬁrming
the district court’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction under W.R.A.P. 12. This would
have eliminated any need to address the charitable trust doctrine or its application
in the case. Instead, the Supreme Court chose to decide the case on the basis of
who has standing to enforce a charitable trust, an issue to which it addressed the
bulk of its decision.48 It would seem doubtful that the Supreme Court would have
devoted such attention to the charitable trust doctrine if it felt that the application
of the doctrine was inappropriate.
Second, the Supreme Court disposed of the case on a technical basis common
to many environmental cases: lack of standing. Such a ruling says nothing about
how the Supreme Court felt about the termination of the Meadowood Easement.
In fact, the Supreme Court’s deliberate invitation to the Attorney General could
be construed evidence that the Supreme Court would like the opportunity to
address the termination issue directly.49

D. Conclusion
While the Supreme Court’s ruling in Hicks may not itself be of great signiﬁcance
nationally, or even in Wyoming, it raises some issues (along with a hint of how
those issues may be addressed by the Court in the future) central to conservation

47

Note that the Wyoming Court does not appear to have speciﬁcally stated whether failure by
the parties to raise the application of the charitable trust doctrine as an issue on appeal barred the
Court from reviewing the matter, or simply excused the Court from doing so. This distinction is an
important one. Were the Court to follow the rule in Texas that “[u]nless the trial court’s ﬁndings
are challenged by a point of error on appeal, they are binding upon the appellate court” Wade v.
Anderson, 602 S.W. 2d 347, 349 (1980), then its acceptance of the district court’s ruling regarding
application of the charitable trust doctrine would be without signiﬁcance. However, if the court were
to follow the rule in Alaska that even though not raised on appeal, “plain error” (i.e. the error affects
substantive rights and is “obviously prejudicial”) may be addressed on appeal, Matter of L.A.M.,
777 P.2d 1057, 1059 (1986), then the court’s acceptance of the district court’s ruling regarding the
charitable trust doctrine may be a signiﬁcant signal that the court accepts the application of the
charitable trust doctrine to conservation easements. Should the Attorney General elect to pursue
Johnson County’s actions further the court may have a chance to clear the air on this point.
48

Four pages of this thirteen-page ruling were devoted to the issue of standing to enforce a
charitable trust, see supra note 2, pages 8–11.
49

While they may rue the termination of the Meadowood Ranch conservation easement,
easement holders throughout Wyoming should breathe a sigh of relief that the Supreme Court did
not rule that any and every Wyoming citizen has standing to challenge how these holders deal with
conservation easements.
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easements. This article will next brieﬂy examine the legal context within which
conservation easements exist. An understanding of this context provides a basis for
considering improper termination and modiﬁcation of conservation easements.

III. LEGAL CONTEXT
A. The Nature of Conservation Easements
“Conservation easements do not ﬁt easily into any previously existing
category of property interests . . . .”50 Perhaps the best conclusion is that, given
the existence of statutory provisions for conservation easements in virtually all
50 states,51 conservation easements are creatures of statute and their attributes,
limitations, and applications are all governed by the statutes that authorize them.
“The statutory conservation easement prevalent today arguably is an entirely
new type of property interest that does not ﬁt into the traditional categories of
easement, real covenant, and equitable servitude.”52
However, even though conservation easements are now creatures of statute,
they have a common-law history dating back to the late 1800s.53 Conservation
easements were not used extensively until after the 1930s.54 Furthermore, when
the Meadowood Easement was granted Wyoming had not yet enacted the
WYUCEA, so common law controlled that conveyance.55
Finally, the Uniform Conservation Easement Act (“UCEA”) itself provides
in § 2(a):56 “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this Act, a conservation easement
may be created, conveyed, recorded, assigned, released, modiﬁed, terminated, or
otherwise altered or affected in the same manner as other easements.” Thus, the
common law of easements is the statutory frame of reference for conservation
50
Jeffrey A. Blackie, Conservation Easements and the Doctrine of Changed Conditions, 40
HASTINGS L.J. 1187, 1190 (1989); see also Duncan M. Greene, Dynamic Conservation Easements:
Facing the Problem of Perpetuity in Land Conservation, 28 SEATTLE U. L. Rev. 883, 891 (2005).
51
Wyoming was one of the last states in the nation to enact enabling legislation authorizing
conservation easements.
52

Blackie, supra note 50, at 1194.

53

Id. at 1191. The ﬁrst “land trust” was created in 1891 through the efforts of Charles
Eliot. It became known as the “Trustees of Reservations of Massachusetts;” J. Breting Engel, The
Development, Status, and Viability of the Conservation Easement as a Private Land Conservation Tool
in the Western United States, 39 URB. LAW. 19, 32-33 (2007).
54

Engel, supra note 53, at 36.

Note; however, that the WYUCEA (WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34-1-205(b) (2007)) applies
retroactively to the Meadowood Easement: “This article shall apply to any interest created before
its effective date if it would have been enforceable had it been created after the effective date of this
article unless retroactive application contravenes the constitution or laws of this state or the United
States.”
55

56

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34-1-202(a) (2007).
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easements. Common-law easements ﬁt into a somewhat confused category of
non-possessory property interests generally known as “servitudes.” A recent
Wyoming case, borrowing heavily from the Restatement (Third) of Property,
provides some important deﬁnitions and distinctions:
(1) A servitude is a legal device that creates a right or an obligation
that runs with land or an interest in land.
(a) Running with the land means that the right or obligation
passes automatically to successive owners or occupiers of the
land or the interest in land with which the right or obligation
runs.
(b) A right that runs with land is called a “beneﬁt” and the
interest in land with which it runs may be called the “beneﬁted”
or “dominant” estate.
(c) An obligation that runs with land is called a “burden” and the
interest in land with which it runs may be called the “burdened”
or “servient” estate. Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Servitudes §
1.1(1) (2000 & Cum. Supp. 2006).
A ‘servitude’ is a general category that includes a variety of nonpossessory interests in land, including easements . . . Id. § 1.1(2).
An easement is deﬁned as ‘an interest in land which entitles the
easement holder to a limited use or enjoyment over another
person’s property.’ Hasvold v. Park County Sch. Dist. No. 6, 2002
WY 65, ¶ 13, 45 P.3d 635, 638 (Wyo. 2002) (quoting Mueller v.
Hoblyn, 887 P.2d 500, 504 (Wyo. 1994)).
[E]asements may be appurtenant to a dominant estate or held in
gross. 25 Am.Jur.2d Easements and Licenses §§ 3, 8, 9; 28A C.J.S.
Easements §§ 9-11. An ‘appurtenant’ non-possessory interest in
land ‘means that the rights or obligations of a servitude are tied
to ownership or occupancy of a particular unit or parcel of land.’
Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Servitudes § 1.5(1). An interest is
‘in gross,’ however, when the right ‘is not tied to ownership or
occupancy of a particular unit or parcel of land.’ Id. § 1.5(2).
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Finally, we note that ‘An easement is normally irrevocable.
Easements . . . can be revoked only if the right to revoke is
expressly reserved and properly exercised.’ Id. § 2.2 cmt. h.57
Given the foregoing deﬁnitions, a conservation easement appears to be a
“servitude,” as it is “a legal device that creates a right or an obligation that runs
with land or an interest in land.”58 However, is it an “easement” (“an interest
in land which entitles the easement holder to a limited use or enjoyment over
another person’s property”59) or is it something else, such as a restrictive covenant
or an equitable servitude, neither of which are considered “interests in land” but
contractual rights.60
A conservation easement, in contrast to a traditional easement, imposes
a “negative” burden on the use of land rather than conferring on the holder a
“limited use or enjoyment” over land. “A traditional easement allows the holder
to make some use of the servient owner’s land, while a restrictive covenant restricts
the servient owner’s use of his land.”61 At common law “negative easements” were
only recognized for four distinct purposes, none of which included the general
protection of open space or natural resources.62
Also in contrast to the traditional easement, a conservation easement is “in
gross.” An easement in gross beneﬁts its holder whether or not the holder owns or
possesses other land. There is a servient estate, but no dominant estate. Hence, an
easement in gross may be described as an irrevocable personal interest in the land
of another.63 Historically, the type of restriction on land imposed by a conservation
easement could only be achieved by a covenant.64 “Traditionally, an easement was
an interest in property while a covenant was merely a promise respecting the use
of land.”65 As can be seen from the foregoing discussion, a conservation easement
has characteristics found in a number of different common law interests.
However, the drafters of the UCEA chose to put conservation easements
into that class of interests known as “easements.” The National Conference of
57

Seven Lakes Development Company, LLC v. Maxon, 144 P.3d 1239, 1245, 2006 WY 136
(Wyo. 2006).
58

Id. at 1245.

59

Id.

60

Blackie, supra note 50, at 1197.

61

Blackie, supra note 50, at 1199.

62

Id. (“At common law there could only be four types of negative easements: easements for
light, air, support of buildings, and ﬂow of artiﬁcial streams.”).
James W. Ely, Jr. and Jon W. Bruce, THE LAW OF EASEMENTS AND INTERESTS IN LAND § 2.2
(2007).
63

64

Blackie, supra note 50, at 1199.

65

Id. at 1197.
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Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (“NCCUSL”), which drafted the UCEA,
chose deliberately to classify conservation easements as
The terminology reﬂects a rejection of two alternatives suggested
in existing state acts dealing with non-possessory conservation
and preservation interests . . . . The easement alternative is
favored in the Act for three reasons. First, lawyers and courts are
most comfortable with easements and easement doctrine, less
so with restrictive covenants and equitable servitudes, and can
be expected to experience severe confusion if the Act opts for
a hybrid fourth interest. Second, the easement is the basic lessthan-fee interest at common law; the restrictive covenant and
the equitable servitude appeared only because of then-current,
but now outdated, limitations of easement doctrine. Finally,
non-possessory interests satisfying the requirements of covenant
real or equitable servitude doctrine will invariably meet the Act’s
less demanding requirements as ‘easements.’ Hence, the Act’s
easement orientation should not prove prejudicial to instruments
drafted as real covenants or equitable servitudes, although the
converse would not be true.66
Thus, while there has been, and will continue to be, much academic analysis
of the nature and origin of conservation easements under the common law,67 for
all practical intents and purposes today, they can be considered “easements.”68
Both the UCEA and the WYUCEA apply retroactively to such “interests”
provided that such interests would have been enforceable under them had they
been created after its enactment.69
Therefore, as a matter of law in Wyoming, and in most states that have
enacted some form of the UCEA, whatever a conservation easement might

66

UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT, Introduction (1981).

67

See, e.g., Blackie, supra note 50; Gerald Korngold, Privately Held Conservation Servitudes: A
Policy Analysis in the Context of In Gross Real Covenants and Easements, 63 TEX. L. REV. 433 (1984).
68

From a practical standpoint perhaps the most critical question is how the federal tax law
considers conservation easements. For its part, the Regulations have created a very large tent within
which to include deductible interests, granting deductions to “perpetual conservation restrictions”
(26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-14(a)(i)(2) (2007)), deﬁned by the Regulations as follows:
A ‘perpetual conservation restriction’ is a restriction granted in perpetuity on the
use which may be made of real property—including, an easement or other interest
in real property that under state law has attributes similar to an easement (e.g., a
restrictive covenant or equitable servitude). For purposes of this section, the terms
easement, conservation restriction, and perpetual conservation restriction have the
same meaning.
69

UCEA, supra note 66, at § 5(b); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34-1-205(b) (2007).
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have been considered prior to the WYUCEA, it is now considered an interest in
property within that class of interests known as an “easement,” regardless of the
date the conservation easement was created. Thus, the Meadowood Easement is
to be considered an “easement” for all purposes under Wyoming law. This leads to
the question of how the class of interests known as easements may be terminated
or modiﬁed.

B. Termination and Modiﬁcation of Easements
There is no developed body of law regarding the termination or modiﬁcation
of conservation easements. As noted previously, the UCEA, including Wyoming’s
version thereof, provides that conservation easements may be modiﬁed or
terminated in the same manner as other easements.70 The UCEA and the
WYUCEA both provide that they do “. . . not affect the power of a court to modify
or terminate a conservation easement in accordance with the principles of law and
equity.”71 Therefore, this article will next examine the common law governing the
termination of traditional easements because the UCEA and WYUCES apply this
body of law to the termination of conservation easements.
According to The Law of Easements and Interests in Land 72 there are at least
fourteen principal means by which traditional easements may be terminated73
of which the following, at least, would appear applicable to conservation
easements:

1. Express Limitations
At common law easements can be terminated based upon an express
limitation included in the terms of the easement.74 “Term easements,” which are
recognized under the UCEA and WYUCEA, include express termination dates.
For example, a conservation easement could expressly provide that it terminates
on the twentieth year after its execution. Or it could provide that it terminates
on, for example, December 31, 2020. Either constitutes an easement with an
express limitation. While term easements are enforceable, the inclusion of such a

70

UCEA, supra note 66, at § 2; WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34-1-202(a) (2007).

71

UCEA, supra note 66, at § 3(b); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34-1-203(b) (2007).

72

Ely & Bruce, supra note 63.

73

Ely & Bruce, supra note 63, Chapter 10 “Termination of Easements,” lists the following
general categories: express limitations; inherent limitations (including cessation of purpose and
end of necessity); destruction of the dominant and/or servient estate; death of the holder of an
easement in gross; release; abandonment (including abandonment by nonuse and abandonment by
the afﬁrmative action of the holder); termination by estoppel; termination by prescription; merger;
sale of the servient parcel to a bona ﬁde purchaser without notice; tax sale of the servient parcel;
mortgage sale of the servient parcel; and condemnation.
74

Ely & Bruce, supra note 63, at § 10.2.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2008

15

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 8 [2008], No. 1, Art. 2

40

WYOMING LAW REVIEW

Vol. 8

provision in a conservation easement will disqualify that easement for federal tax
beneﬁts because those beneﬁts depend upon easements being perpetual.75

2. Inherent Limitations—Cessation of Purpose
Common law easements are considered to contain the inherent limitation that,
if the purpose of the easement no longer exists, the easement terminates.76 Thus,
if an easement exists to provide access to a public road, and the road is abandoned
and removed, the easement would terminate. A conservation easement for the
limited purpose of protecting habitat for the black-footed ferret, for example,
would be considered to contain an inherent limitation causing it to terminate in
the event of the extinction of the ferret.

3. Intentional Release
At common law when the holder of an easement released that easement to the
owner of the parcel servient to the easement, it was considered terminated. By the
same token, if the owner of the easement and the owner of the servient estate were
to agree to a modiﬁcation of the easement, it would be considered modiﬁed.77
One caveat to the argument that the holder of an easement (in the case of an
easement in gross) or the owner of the dominant parcel (in the case of an easement
appurtenant) and the owner of the servient parcel can agree to the termination of
an easement is the common law rule that a release is only effective as to those with
an ownership interest in the easement who agree to the release.78 This rule would
also appear applicable to easement modiﬁcations.

75

Supra note 68.

76

Ely & Bruce, supra note 63, describes this limit in § 10.8 as follows:
An easement created to serve a particular purpose ends when the underlying
purpose no longer exists. This cessation of purpose doctrine is designed to eliminate
meaningless burdens on land and is based on the notion that parties that create an
easement for a speciﬁc purpose intend the servitude to expire upon cessation of that
purpose.
Inquiry in cessation of purpose cases begins with determining the particular purpose
of the easement in question. A provision in the easement instrument often indicates
the parties’ intent in this regard. When an easement purpose provision is ambiguous,
courts examine the surrounding circumstances to ascertain the parties’ intent and
tend to favor the grantee with a broad interpretation. Next, one must decide whether
the contemplated purpose still exists. If not, the easement is considered to have
expired.” (citations omitted).

77

See, e.g., Ely & Bruce, supra note 63, at § 10.20.

78

Ely & Bruce, supra note 63, at § 10.17: “When two or more parties hold interests in the
dominant estate, a release executed by one interest holder is binding solely on that party. Likewise,
when an easement beneﬁts two or more estates, a release granted by one dominant owner does not
affect the rights of the owners of the other dominant estates.” (footnotes omitted).
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Typical conservation easements provide little, if any, documentary basis for
ﬁnding that there are any parties to the easement other than the holder of the
easement and the owner of the parcel servient to the easement. The terms of
the typical easement, and expressions of the intentions of the parties rarely, if
ever, indicate that either party intended anyone other than the grantee named in
the easement to have an interest in, or right of control over, the easement. With
respect to conservation easements granted as appurtenant easements, as is the
case with most Wyoming conservation easements, there is even less doubt that
the grantee is the sole owner of the easement because the grantee of the easement
is almost always the sole owner of a dominant parcel for the beneﬁt of which the
conservation easement has been granted.
In the author’s experience79 landowners contemplating the contribution of a
conservation easement are quite interested in the philosophy and operation of the
prospective holder of their conservation easements and, to the extent it is possible,
will “shop around” for that organization whose philosophy and operation most
closely ﬁt their own goals for the future of their property. Landowners are, in
effect, inviting a land trust or government agency, to become a “partner” in the
ownership and management of their land by granting a conservation easement
and landowners are normally very particular about who this partner is and how
it will be to deal with them in the future. Given this understandable concern by
landowners, it is hard to imagine that easement donors intend to grant the future
ownership and control of a conservation easement over their land to other than
the original grantee.

4. Estoppel
Where the owner of a servient parcel takes actions that are inconsistent with
terms of an easement and the holder of the easement knowingly allows that action
to take place, the easement owner may be estopped, on equitable principles, from
later objecting to the servient owner’s actions.80 However, in the Massachusetts
case of Weston Forest & Trail Association v. Fishman, 849 N.E.2d 916 (Mass. App.
Ct. 2006), the Massachusetts Appellate Court rejected a claim that a conservation
easement was no longer valid based on estoppel, laches and waiver theories,
because the court determined that such theories do not apply where there is a
potential loss of public rights and beneﬁts involved.
Courts may be unlikely to allow termination or modiﬁcation of a conservation
easement on the grounds of estoppel if they view conservation easements as being

79

The author represents and has represented a number of land trusts and landowners with
respect to the conveyance of conservation easements over the past ﬁfteen years and has, himself,
granted conservation easements on farms in Michigan and Virginia.
80

Ely & Bruce, supra note 63, at § 10.21.
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for the beneﬁt of the public at large.81 However, suppose that a land trust held
a conservation easement that prohibited any construction on the servient parcel
and that the land trust knowingly ignored the construction of a new house on the
servient parcel but later sought removal of the house after it was completed. It
seems unlikely in such a case that a court would require removal of the house, or
even the payment of substantial damages by the landowner to the land trust. In
such a case it seems probable the court would apply equitable estoppel to protect
the landowner.

5. Termination by Merger
Merger occurs when the owner of a dominant parcel acquires the servient
parcel, or vice versa, so that both the dominant and servient parcels come into
common ownership. In such a case the easement is considered to “merge” into
the fee ownership and disappear.82 Merger also applies to easements in gross.83 It
would appear that a conservation easement could merge with the fee that is subject
to the easement if a land trust acquired both the easement and the servient parcel.
However, where the common owner of the dominant and servient interests owns
one interest as a trustee, for example, the interests may not merge.84 If a land trust
is considered to hold a conservation easement in trust for the public 85 this rule
would appear to preclude the possibility that the easement could be terminated
by merger.

6. Tax Sale
Taxing authorities typically have an inchoate lien on land for the payment of
delinquent taxes, whenever that delinquency occurs. Unless a tax lien is expressly
subordinated to a conservation easement (which is unheard of ), a sale of land
to pay delinquent taxes may extinguish the easement.86 Taxing authority varies
greatly from state to state and the effect of a tax sale on a conservation easement
is beyond the scope of this article.

7. Mortgage Sale
An easement will be terminated by the sale of the servient parcel pursuant
to a prior mortgage.87 Unless the holder of a mortgage existing at the time of

81
Id. “Courts are reluctant to extinguish public easements by estoppel. Indeed, in some
jurisdictions, the extinguishment-by-estoppel doctrine apparently cannot be employed to terminate
public rights-of-way.” Id.
82

Ely & Bruce, supra note 63, at § 2.27.

83

Id.

84

Id.

85

E.g., McLaughlin, supra note 7.

86

See Ely & Bruce, supra note 63.

87

Ely & Bruce, supra note 63, at § 10:41.
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conveyance of a conservation easement agrees to subordinate its interest to the
easement, a future default in payment of the sum secured by the mortgage can
result in a mortgage sale in which the property is sold free of the conservation
easement. For this reason federal tax law requires that outstanding mortgages
be subordinated to any conservation easement for which a tax deduction is
sought.88

8. Condemnation
A privately held easement may be terminated directly by an exercise of
eminent domain. In addition, if the parcel servient to an easement is condemned
the easement over that parcel will also terminate.89 Conservation easements held
by private conservation organizations are private property and, as such, are subject
to condemnation by governmental agencies, and others invested with the power of
condemnation, such as utilities. Conservation easements held by public agencies
are not subject to condemnation; however, other circumstances may lead to the
termination of such easements.90 In addition, and more frequently, land subject
to a conservation easement is subject to condemnation and the future use of the
property after such condemnation is likely to be such as to eliminate the purpose
for the conservation easement, leading to its de facto termination, or termination
by judicial decree.

9. Easement Termination and Modiﬁcation in Wyoming
Prior to enactment of the WYUCEA in 2005, Wyoming had no statutory
provision for conservation easements. Until then a conservation easement in
Wyoming, like any other easement, needed to meet the following requirements:
An ‘easement’ is an interest in land which entitles the easement
holder to a limited use or enjoyment over another person’s
property. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 450(a) (1944). See also
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 509 (6th ed. 1990). This court has
recognized that an easement has ﬁve essential qualities: ﬁrst, an
easement is incorporeal or without material nature; second, an
easement is imposed upon corporeal property, not the owner of
the property; third, an easement confers no right to participate
in the proﬁts arising from the property; fourth, an easement is

88

26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-14(g)(2) (2007).

89

Ely & Bruce, supra note 63, at § 10.42.

90

E.g., a conservation easement held by a local government is not subject to the federal power of
condemnation, and vice versa. However, if the Federal Highway Administration decides to construct
a road through such an easement it will likely have sufﬁcient leverage with the locality to induce it to
terminate the easement in favor of the highway project. Localities are creatures of the state; therefore
it is axiomatic that the state has power to over-ride a locally held conservation easement.
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imposed for the beneﬁt of corporeal property and; ﬁfth, there
must be two distinct estates, the dominant estate, the one to which
the right belongs, and the servient estate, the one upon which the
obligation is imposed. Belle Fourche Pipeline Co. v. State, 766
P.2d 537, 543 (Wyo.1988) (quoting Day v. Buckeye Water
Conservation & Drainage Dist., 28 Ariz. 466, 237 P. 636, 640
(1925)).91
It is clear from the traditional easement cases in Wyoming92 that a traditional
easement in Wyoming, absent some statutory authority, requires both a servient
and dominant parcel. For this reason, prior to enactment of the WYUCEA, most
conservation easements in Wyoming were created as appurtenant easements.93 The
WYUCEA eliminates, for conservation easements, the traditional requirements
applicable for the creation of easements, including the requirement for a
dominant and servient parcel.94 However, the WYUCEA, which has retroactive
application, also provides that conservation easements are to be terminated or
modiﬁed in the same manner as other easements.95 Therefore, although the
creation of conservation easements in Wyoming has been freed from compliance
with common law rules by the WYUCEA; modiﬁcation or termination of
conservation easements continues to be governed by the common law.
Under the common law the parties to an easement (the holder of the easement
or owner of the dominant parcel, and the owner of the servient parcel) have the
right to “release” the easement back to the owner of the servient parcel.96 An
easement may also be terminated when the purpose of the easement can no longer
be fulﬁlled under the common law principles applicable to the termination of
easements for “cessation of purpose.”97 In the absence of case law to the contrary,
it is presumed these principles apply to traditional easements, and therefore to
conservation easements, in Wyoming.
91
Mueller v. Hoblyn, 887 P.2d 500, 504 (Wyo. 1994); Seven Lakes Development Company,
LLC v. Maxon, 144 P.3d 1239, 1245 (Wyo. 2006) (emphasis added).
92

“Traditional” refers to easements as recognized at common law.

93

This was done by having the prospective easement grantor ﬁrst convey a small parcel of land
in fee to the prospective holder of the conservation easement. Once the fee parcel was conveyed the
grantor then (typically in a contemporaneous transaction) conveyed the conservation easement,
which was conveyed expressly for the beneﬁt of and appurtenant to the fee parcel. This was the
approach taken by the Lowham Limited Partnership in creating the Meadowood Easement.
94

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34-1-204 (2007).

95

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34-1-202(a) (2007).

96

See the discussion of “release,” supra text accompanying note 77. Note that neither of the
parties to the Hicks suit, and neither of the courts considering the suit, appeared to consider this
line of reasoning which clearly suggests that, in this case of ﬁrst impression, no one was thinking
of the conservation easement in the common law terms that seem dictated by the nature of the
Meadowood Easement and the terms of the Act.
97

See the discussion of “cessation of purpose,” supra note 76.
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B. Tax Code Restrictions on the Right to Terminate or Modify Conservation
Easements
Thus far, this article has examined the common law as it pertains to
conservation easements, and the termination or modiﬁcation of such easements.
However federal tax law is another body of law that is highly relevant, increasingly
vigorous, and that governs the administration of a great many conservation
easements throughout the United States.

1. Mandatory Conservation Easement Provisions
Federal tax law applies in several ways to conservation easements. First, in
order for a conservation easement to be eligible for federal tax beneﬁts (and many
state tax beneﬁts), the easement must comply with § 170(h) of the Code and
§ 1.170A-14 of the Regulations. These rules expressly address the termination and
modiﬁcation of deductible conservation easements and, in so doing, tie the hands
of the grantor of the conservation easement; the grantor’s successors in ownership
of the land that is subject to the easement; and the holder of the easement. There
are several ways in which the tax law does this:
a. Deductible conservation easements must be “in perpetuity.”98
b. Deductible conservation easements can only be held by a
“qualiﬁed organization.”99
c. Deductible conservation easements must require that, in the
event the holder of the easement goes out of existence, or decides
to transfer the easement, the holder must transfer the easement
to another “qualiﬁed organization” that agrees, in writing, to
carry out the conservation purposes of the easement.100

98
See 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(2) (2007). Neither the Code nor Regulations provide for
or contemplate that, deductible conservation easements can be amended or voluntarily terminated
except by a court due to changed circumstances. Nevertheless, it is clear that conservation easements
are amended and, as evidenced by Hicks, even voluntarily terminated on rare occasion.
99

26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-14(c) (2007). A qualiﬁed organization is either a governmental agency,
or a public charity recognized under 26 U.S.C.A § 501(c)(3), and meeting the public support test
of 26 U.S.C.A. § 509(a), or is an organization described in 26 U.S.C.A. § 170(b)(1)(A)(vi). In
any case, and signiﬁcantly, the agency or organization must “have a commitment to protect the
conservation purposes of the donation, and have the resources to enforce the restrictions.” Perhaps
one of the most practical questions raised by the Hicks case is whether it should be assumed that a
government agency, or creature of such an agency, should automatically be considered to have the
commitment to protect the conservation purposes required by the tax law.
100

C.F.R. § 1.1.70A-14(c)(2) (2007).
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d. Deductible conservation easements must require that, in the
event of a termination of the easement for any reason, proceeds
from the sale of the underlying property must be shared between
the owner of that property and the holder of the easement in
proportion to the value of the easement and value of the parcel
servient to the easement.101
Subject to the three-year statute of limitations limiting audits of nonfraudulent returns (see, e.g. Steven J. Small, The Federal Tax Law of Conservation
Easements, p. 16-4.03) these requirements must be met by the terms of every
deductible conservation easement and thereby become binding on the parties to
the easement. Of course, as Hicks vividly demonstrates, even though a conservation
easement meets all of these requirements, that will not prevent the parties from
ignoring these requirements and terminating or modifying an easement as they
see ﬁt. However, there are external constraints on the parties as well.

2. The “Tax Beneﬁt Rule”
For a landowner who contributes a conservation easement, receives a tax
deduction, and later is a party to the modiﬁcation or termination of the easement
in a manner that is personally ﬁnancially beneﬁcial, the “tax beneﬁt rule” requires
“recovery” of the amount of income tax beneﬁt generated by the deduction.102
However, where an easement termination or modiﬁcation beneﬁts a taxpayer
other than the original donor, as in the Hicks case, the tax beneﬁt rule has no
application.

3. Limitations Imposed on Public Charities
Some of the most potent tax rules are those prohibiting an organization
exempt from tax under § 501(c)(3) of the Code (known as “public charities”) from
engaging in “excess beneﬁt transactions.” Recall that in order to hold a tax deductible
conservation easement the easement holder must be a “qualiﬁed organization.”103
There are two categories of qualiﬁed organizations: (i) governmental agencies; and
(ii) public charities recognized as exempt from taxation pursuant to § 501(c)(3) of
the Code.104 Public charities, for purposes of holding conservation easements, may
be further classiﬁed as purely private organizations, or as government-afﬁliated
organizations (such as the Johnson County Scenic Preserve Trust).105
101

C.F.R. § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(ii) (2007).

102

Nash v. U.S., 398 U.S. 1, 3 (1970) (describing the requirements of § 111 of the Internal
Revenue Code).
103

26 U.S.C.A. § 170(h)(3) (2007).

104

Id.

105

See Instructions to Form 990, Items A and B under “General Instructions,” and Rev. Proc.
95-48, infra note 110.
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Public charity status provides two signiﬁcant beneﬁts to an organization. First,
such status relieves the organization from liability for the payment of income
tax on its earnings. Second, contributions made to a public charity by taxpayers
are deductible from the taxpayer’s income for federal taxation purposes. These
beneﬁts are fundamental to maintaining public charity status, which is central to
the survival of private land trusts.
The description of the type of organization that qualiﬁes as a public charity
is found in Code § 501(c)(3) and provides the basis for the restrictions imposed
upon the operation of public charities:
Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation,
organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable,
scientiﬁc, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes,
or to foster national or international amateur sports competition
(but only if no part of its activities involve the provision of
athletic facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty
to children or animals, no part of the net earnings of which
inures to the beneﬁt of any private shareholder or individual,
no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on
propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to inﬂuence legislation
(except as otherwise provided in subsection (h)), and which does
not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or
distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of
(or in opposition to) any candidate for public ofﬁce.106
The requirement that a public charity “be organized and operated exclusively”
for charitable purposes, and the requirement that none of the net earnings of such
an organization “inure to the beneﬁt of any private shareholder or individual,”
signiﬁcantly affect the ability of private land trusts to terminate or modify
conservation easements.107 The ﬁrst of these two requirements is sometimes
described as the prohibition against “private beneﬁt” and applies to all transactions
in which a public charity engages. The second requirement is often referred to as
the prohibition against “private inurement” and applies speciﬁcally to transactions
between a public charity and an “insider.” More generally, these two requirements
are referred to as the prohibition against “excess beneﬁt transactions;” however,
as described infra, the effect of the excess beneﬁt rule only applies to transactions
involving insiders.
The constraints imposed on public charities by Code § 501(c)(3) do not
apply to government agencies, like Johnson County, which are qualiﬁed to
106

26 U.S.C.A. § 501(c)(3) (2007) (emphasis added).

107

See the discussion of “excess beneﬁt transactions,” infra notes 129-34 (and accompanying

text).
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hold deductible conservation easements without regard to Code § 501(c)(3). In
addition, government-afﬁliated public charities, such as the Johnson County Scenic
Preserve Trust, while technically subject to the same limitations and penalties as
purely private land trusts, are distinct from private land trusts in several signiﬁcant
ways: (i) they are generally not dependent upon donor generated funds for their
operations; (ii) they are controlled by a government agency; and (iii) they are
exempt from the reporting requirements that apply to other public charities.108
The distinction between conservation easement holders that are purely
private land trusts; those that are government-afﬁliated land trusts; and those
that are government agencies; are signiﬁcant because they affect the application
and effectiveness of federal restrictions. A typical private land trust must depend
upon public support (and approbation) for its continued existence. Indeed, a land
trust that is qualiﬁed to hold deductible conservation easements must derive at
least one-third of its support from the general public.109 In addition, it is required
to report, in detail, its activities on an annual basis to the IRS on Form 990.
Form 990, as of 2006, requires any exempt organization that holds conservation
easements to attach a special schedule detailing its management of the easements
that it holds.110
108

Rev. Proc. 95-48 (1995). This discretionary ruling by the Secretary of the Treasury exempts
government-afﬁliated organizations, such as land trusts set up and controlled by a locality (e.g.
the Johnson County Scenic Preserve Trust) from ﬁling Form 990, an information return required
to be ﬁled annually by most exempt organizations to insure their continued qualiﬁcation under §
501(c)(3), among other things.
109

Supra note 99.

110

Form 990, Schedule A, line 3c asks: “Did the organization receive or hold an easement for
conservation purposes, including easements to preserve open space, the environment, historic land
areas or historic structures? If “Yes,” attach a detailed statement.”
The Instructions to Form 990, Schedule A, line 3c are as follows:
Answer ‘Yes’ if the organization received or held one or more conservation easements
during the year. In general, an easement is an interest in the land of another. A
conservation easement is an interest in the land of another for purposes that include
environmental protection; the preservation of open space; or the preservation of
property for history, education, or recreation purposes. For more information see
Notice 2004-41, 2004-28 I.R.B 31.
Attached Schedule. If ‘Yes,’ the organization must attach a schedule that includes
the following information.
1. The number of easements held at the beginning of the year, the acreage of these
easements and the number of states where the easements are located.
2. The number of easements and the acreage of these easements that the organization
received or acquired during the year.
3. The number of easements modiﬁed, sold, transferred, released, or terminated
during the year and the acreage of these easements. For each easement,
explain the reason for the modiﬁcation, sale, transfer, release or termination.
Also, identify the recipient (if any), and show if the recipient was a qualiﬁed
organization (as deﬁned in section 170(h)(3) and the related regulations at the
time of transfer).
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A government-afﬁliated land trust, although it may be qualiﬁed as a public
charity under Code § 501(c)(3) and be subject to the restrictions on its activities
imposed by that law, is not required to report its activities annually on Form 990,
and is typically not reliant on donor contributions or public support in general.
A government agency that holds conservation easements is not subject to the
provisions of Code § 501(c)(3) or the excess beneﬁt rules; it does not depend
upon donor support, and it may have many agendas in addition to, or in conﬂict
with, the careful management and enforcement of the conservation easements
that it holds.

4. Prohibition on “Excess Beneﬁt Transactions”
As noted previously, the deﬁnition of “exempt organization” provided by
Code § 501(c)(3) excludes from exempt status organizations “any part of the net
earnings of which inures to the beneﬁt of any private shareholder or individual.”111
Transactions in which an exempt organization allows such beneﬁts to accrue to a
private shareholder or individual are known as “excess beneﬁt transactions” and
are expressly prohibited by federal law.112 Transactions violating this prohibition
confer “private inurement” and are sometimes referred to as “private inurement
transactions.”

4. Show the number of easements held for each of the following categories:
a. Easements on buildings or structures;
b. Easements that encumber a golf course or portions of a golf course;
c. Easements within or adjacent to residential developments and housing
subdivisions, including easements related to the development of property;
and
d. Conservation easements that were acquired in a transaction described
under Purchase of Real Property from Charitable Organizations in Notice
2004-41 and if the organization acquired any such easements during the
year.
5. The number of easements and the acreage of these easements that were monitored
by physical inspection or other means during the tax year.
6. Total staff hours and a list of expenses devoted to (legal fees, portion of staff
salaries, etc.) incurred for monitoring and enforcing new or existing easements
during the tax year.
7. Identify all easement on buildings or structures acquired after August 17,
2006, and show if each easement meets the requirements of section 170(h)(4)(B).
(emphasis added).
111

26 U.S.C.A. § 501(c)(3) (2007).

112

26 U.S.C.A. § 4958 (2007).
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The Code deﬁnes excess beneﬁt transaction, and excess beneﬁt, as follows:
(1) Excess beneﬁt transaction
(A) In general. The term ‘excess beneﬁt transaction’ means any
transaction in which an economic beneﬁt is provided by an
applicable tax-exempt organization directly or indirectly to or
for the use of any disqualiﬁed person if the value of the economic
beneﬁt provided exceeds the value of the consideration (including
the performance of services) received for providing such beneﬁt.
For purposes of the preceding sentence, an economic beneﬁt
shall not be treated as consideration for the performance of
services unless such organization clearly indicated its intent to
so treat such beneﬁt.
(B) Excess beneﬁt. The term ‘excess beneﬁt’ means the excess
referred to in subparagraph (A).113
The class of persons covered by the prohibition against excess beneﬁt
transactions are referred to by the Code as “disqualiﬁed persons,” and often as
“insiders,” and includes:
Any person who was in a position to exercise substantial inﬂuence
over the affairs of an organization at any time during the ﬁve-year
period ending on the date of a transaction is a disqualiﬁed person
with respect to that transaction. The spouse, ancestors, siblings,
children, grandchildren, and great grandchildren of such a person
(and the spouses of his or her siblings and descendants) are also
disqualiﬁed persons. A 35% controlled entity (a corporation,
partnership or trust 35% owned by disqualiﬁed persons) is also
a disqualiﬁed person.114
A “substantial contributor” is included within the class of “disqualiﬁed
persons.” The rules governing excess beneﬁt transactions incorporate the deﬁnition
of “substantial contributor” that applies to private foundations:115
the term ‘substantial contributor’ means any person who
contributed or bequeathed an aggregate amount of more than
$5,000 to the private foundation, if such amount is more than
2 percent of the total contributions and bequests received

113

26 U.S.C. § 4958(c)(1) (2006).

114

9 MERTENS LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 34:254. (citations omitted).

115

26 C.F.R. § 53.4958-3(e)(2)(ii) (2007).
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by the foundation before the close of the taxable year of the
foundation in which the contribution or bequest is received by
the foundation from such person. In the case of a trust, the term
‘substantial contributor’ also means the creator of the trust.116
The amount of contributions considered in determining whether a person
is a “substantial contributor,” for purposes of determining whether such person
is a disqualiﬁed person, are contributions made in the tax year of the transaction
plus the four preceding years.117 In other words, a contributor is a substantial
contributor if his or her contributions over a ﬁve year period aggregate more than
2% of the donee’s total contributions and exceed $5,000.
Given the value attributable to many conservation easements for the donor’s
tax deduction purposes, it is likely that many conservation easement contributors,
even if they contribute nothing else to an organization, fall within the category of
“substantial contributor.” This assumes, however, that an easement contribution
is, or should be, valued in the same manner as the contribution of other property
or cash. However, a conservation easement has no real fair market value because
there is no “market” for conservation easements once they have been contributed.
In fact, a conservation easement in the hands of the holder represents a liability to
the holder.118
There is no guidance with respect to how a conservation easement contribution
would be valued by the IRS for purposes of determining whether the contributor
of such an easement was a “substantial contributor” by reason of such contribution.
However, the real question is whether such a contribution places the contributor
in a position to have substantial inﬂuence over the holder of the easement. The
answer to this question “depends upon all relevant facts and circumstances.”119
Sufﬁce it to say that there are respectable arguments to be made on both sides of
the question.
The penalty for an individual who engages in an excess beneﬁt transaction
with a public charity is two-fold: the individual is subject to an excise tax in
the amount of 25% of the excess beneﬁt120 and the individual must “correct”
the transaction.121 Correction of the transaction requires the beneﬁciary of the
transaction to restore the beneﬁt received. In other words, the beneﬁciary of an
116

26 U.S.C.A. § 507(d)(2)(A) (2007).

117

26 C.F.R. § 53.4958-3(e)(2)(ii) (2007), incorporating the deﬁnition of “substantial
contributor” provided by 26 U.S.C.A. § 507(d)(2)(A) (2007).
118
For example, the liability for the costs of monitoring and enforcing the easement in
perpetuity.
119

26 C.F.R. § 53.4958-3(e)(1) (2007).

120

26 U.S.C. § 4958(a)(1) (2006).

121

26 C.F.R. § 53.4958-7 (2007).
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excess beneﬁt transaction must give back the beneﬁt, plus a 25% excise tax on the
amount of the beneﬁt. If the transaction is not corrected and the excise tax is not
paid within the “correction period”122 a penalty in the amount of 200% of the
excess beneﬁt is imposed on the individual.123
Managers of an exempt organization knowingly engaging in an excess beneﬁt
transaction are also subject to an excise tax of 10% of the excess beneﬁt, not to
exceed $20,000.124 Furthermore, the IRS has the authority to revoke the exempt
status of an organization that engages in an excess beneﬁt transaction,125 and the
Regulations make clear that the excise tax provisions do not replace the other
requirements for qualifying for and maintaining exempt status.126 Revocation of
public charity status is the death knell for most public charities; consequently the
excess beneﬁt rules provide a strong incentive to public charities not to engage in
excess beneﬁt transactions; provided that these rules are understood.
There is no distinction made in the Code or Regulations between assets
acquired by a deductible contribution, or otherwise, with respect to application
of the excess beneﬁt rules, or the requirement that assets be used exclusively for
charitable purposes, infra. Thus, the improper termination or modiﬁcation of
a conservation easement, regardless of whether the easement was acquired by
contribution, purchase, or exaction, and whether the grantor of the easement
enjoyed any tax beneﬁts for the conveyance of the easement, is subject to the
excess beneﬁt prohibition.

5. Prohibition Against Conferring Private Beneﬁt
In addition to the prohibition against “excess beneﬁt transactions” involving
“disqualiﬁed persons,” the tax code also requires that exempt organizations be
“organized and operated exclusively” for charitable purposes.127 This rule is
sometimes referred to as the prohibition against “private beneﬁt” to distinguish it
from the prohibition against “private inurement.”

122

Id.

123

26 C.F.R. § 53.4958-1(c)(2)(i) (2007).

124

26 U.S.C.A. §§ 4958(a)(2) and (d)(2) (2007).

125

Ferguson v. Centura Health Corp., 358 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1017 (D. Colo. 2004). See also,
Universal Life Church v. United States, 128 F.3d 1294, 1298 (9th Cir. 1997), where the 9th Circuit
Court stated:
when the IRS revokes the tax exempt status of organizations which do not meet the
501(c)(3) requirements, it serves a public trust function in assuring the public that
501(c)(3) tax exempt status is conferred and retained only by organizations engaged
in appropriately charitable functions . . . .
126

26 C.F.R. § 53.4958-8(a) (2007).

127

Supra note 107.
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(c) Operational test—(1) Primary activities. An organization
will be regarded as operated exclusively for one or more
exempt purposes only if it engages primarily in activities which
accomplish one or more of such exempt purposes speciﬁed in
section 501(c)(3). An organization will not be so regarded if more
than an insubstantial part of its activities is not in furtherance of
an exempt purpose.128
Among other things, this requirement says that an exempt organization
may not engage in the equivalent of an excess beneﬁt transaction with anyone,
regardless of whether they fall within the deﬁnition of “disqualiﬁed person.”
This is because engaging in the equivalent of an excess beneﬁt transaction129 with
someone who is not an insider still involves the use of assets of the organization in
a manner that confers a private, rather than a public, beneﬁt, thereby violating the
requirement that the organization be operated exclusively for public purposes.
The requirement that assets be used exclusively for charitable purposes constitutes
a prohibition on transactions that confer a “private beneﬁt.”
The requirement that an exempt organization be operated exclusively for
charitable purposes is viewed by the courts as imposing an additional requirement
on charities that their activities confer no more than an “incidental” private beneﬁt,
regardless of whether or not the beneﬁciaries are “disqualiﬁed persons.”130 The
exempt organization engaging in the equivalent of an excess beneﬁt transaction,
but with a person who is not a disqualiﬁed person, runs the risk of losing its
exempt status.
128

26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c) (2007).

129

“Equivalent” but not “identical” because an excess beneﬁt transaction, by deﬁnition, must
involve a disqualiﬁed person.
130

American Campaign Academy, supra at 1068, 1069:
Petitioner misconstrues the overlapping characteristics of the private beneﬁt and
private inurement prohibitions. We have consistently recognized that while the
prohibitions against private inurement and private beneﬁts share common and often
overlapping elements, Church of Ethereal Joy v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 20, 21
(1984), Goldsboro Art League, Inc. v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 337, 345 n.10 (1980),
the two are distinct requirements which must independently be satisﬁed. Canada v.
Commissioner, 82 T.C. 973, 981 (1984); Aid to Artisans, Inc. v. Commissioner, 71
T.C. at 215.
The absence of private inurement of earnings to the beneﬁt of a private shareholder
or individual does not, however, establish that the organization is operated
exclusively for exempt purposes. Therefore, while the private inurement prohibition
may arguably be subsumed within the private beneﬁt analysis of the operational test,
the reverse is not true. Accordingly, when the Court concludes that no prohibited
inurement of earnings exists, it cannot stop there but must inquire further and
determine whether a prohibited private beneﬁt is conferred. See Aid to Artisans, Inc.
v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. at 215; Retired Teachers Legal Fund v. Commissioner, 78
T.C. 280, 287 (1982).
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However, revocation of status is the only sanction available to the IRS in
dealing with transactions that confer impermissible “private beneﬁt” as opposed
to “private inurement.”131 Excess beneﬁt transactions are limited to “disqualiﬁed
persons” as deﬁned in the law. Because not all persons are “disqualiﬁed persons,”
it is possible for someone who is not a disqualiﬁed person to engage in the
equivalent of an excess beneﬁt transaction with a public charity without incurring
any penalty,132 but exposing the charity to loss of its exempt status.
The IRS has been reluctant in the past to invoke what is the ultimate
punishment for a public charity: revocation of charity status. This is one reason
why Congress created an intermediate punishment in the form of excise tax
penalties for excess beneﬁt transactions.133 Furthermore, the rule that “no more
than an insubstantial part” of an exempt organization’s activities be for other
than its exempt purposes is a situational, and far less precise standard than the
prohibition against excess beneﬁt transactions, for which the law provides an
exact measurement.134 For example, an organization with $100 million in assets
could, presumably, engage in private beneﬁt transactions valued in the millions
and still consider those transactions to be an “insubstantial part” of its assets. On
the other hand, for an organization whose assets are valued at $100,000, very few
private beneﬁt transactions would be considered “insubstantial.”
For these reasons, the improper termination or modiﬁcation of conservation
easements involving persons other than disqualiﬁed persons is less likely to be
deterred than such actions involving disqualiﬁed persons.

6. Organizational Requirements for Public Charities
In order to qualify as a public charity under Code § 501(c)(3) an entity must
be “organized . . . exclusively for . . .” charitable purposes.135 This requirement
mandates that the organizing documentation136 of such an entity strictly limit
the activities of the entity to those that are consistent with the purposes which
qualify the organization for public charity status, and that such documentation

131
“Private inurement” applies exclusively to the beneﬁts generated to disqualiﬁed persons
from excess beneﬁt transactions.
132
The exception would be if the transaction constitutes recovery of an item with respect to
which the person previously received a “tax beneﬁt” as provided in 28 U.S.C.A. § 111 (2007).
133

MERTENS LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, supra note 114.

134

26 C.F.R. § 53.4968-1(b) (2007) provides:
An excess beneﬁt is the amount by which the value of the economic beneﬁt provided
by an applicable tax-exempt organization directly or indirectly to or for the use
of any disqualiﬁed person exceeds the value of the consideration (including the
performance of services) received for providing such beneﬁt.

135

Supra note 107.

136

For example articles of incorporation, articles of organization, etc. and by-laws.
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does not permit activities that extend beyond such purposes.137 Assuming that a
land trust138 has complied with this requirement (organizations seeking exempt
status are required to submit copies of organizational documents to the IRS for
purposes of determining compliance139) any action to improperly terminate or
modify a conservation easement would be ultra vires and potentially voidable or,
arguably, illegal and void.140 Arguably, transactions involving either private beneﬁt
or private inurement are a violation of federal law and are, therefore, “illegal.”
In Wyoming the Supreme Court has applied the doctrine of ultra vires
to set aside a non-proﬁt corporation’s transfer to an irrevocable trust of funds
required by the corporation’s by-laws to be used for operational expenses, where
the irrevocable trust did not so limit use of the funds.141 However, Wyoming law
also provides that no act of a non-proﬁt corporation will be declared ultra vires

137

26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(1)(b) (2007).

138

Whether purely private, or a government-afﬁliated land trust.

139

See IRS Form 1023 and the accompanying instructions.

140

The following citation provides the general basis for these statements:
Generally, ‘ultra vires acts’ by a corporation are acts beyond the scope of express or
implied powers conferred upon the corporation by the corporate charter or articles
of incorporation and the laws in the state of incorporation. It has also been said
that an act of a corporation is ultra vires, or beyond its power, when the act is
outside the objects for which the corporation is created, as deﬁned in the law of its
organization.
19 C.J.S. Corporations § 673 (citations omitted).
It is generally recognized that a corporation cannot enter into, or bind itself by,
a contract which is expressly prohibited by its charter or by statute, and in the
application of this principle it is immaterial that the contract, except for the
prohibition, would be lawful. No one is permitted to justify an act which the
legislature, within its constitutional power, has declared will not be performed.
18B AM. JUR. Corporations § 1734 (citation omitted).
However, the terms ‘ultra vires’ and ‘illegality’ represent distinct ideas. An illegal act
of a corporation is one expressly prohibited by statute or against public policy and,
thus, a corporate act may be ultra vires without being illegal.
As a general rule, corporate transactions and contracts which are illegal, as
distinguished from merely ultra vires, are void and cannot support an action nor
become enforceable by performance, ratiﬁcation, or estoppel.
The doctrine of ultra vires has no application if a private corporation makes a
contract which is prohibited by statute; for instance, even though an ultra vires
contract may become enforceable once it is partially executed or through estoppel,
no contract rights arise if the corporation engages in a prohibited act. Conversely,
if there is no prohibitory statute, which invalidates the transaction at issue, the
transaction is merely ultra vires, and statutes limiting the defense are applicable.
19 C.J.S. Corporations § 674.

141

Jewish Cmty. Ass’n of Casper v. Cmty. First Nat’l Bank, 6 P.3d 1264, 1267 (Wyo. 2000).
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where a third party has acquired rights as a result of the act.142 Furthermore, it
is generally the case that courts do not favor ultra vires as a means of challenging
corporate actions, and that state statutes increasingly prevent the assertion of ultra
vires in a manner that would disrupt the legitimate expectations of third parties.143
However, there is a distinction between actions that are ultra vires and those that
are illegal.144 The latter are not “voidable” but “void.”
Arguably, the improper termination of a conservation easement is not only an
ultra vires action by the land trust, and therefore voidable, but is also illegal under
the terms of the Code and, therefore, void and unenforceable, and outside of the
third party protection afforded by the Wyoming statute.

7. Requirements Imposed on “Qualiﬁed Organizations”
In addition to the foregoing constraints, all organizations “qualiﬁed” to hold
deductible conservation easements are required to “have a commitment to protect
the conservation purposes of the donation.”145 This requirement would appear to
prohibit a qualiﬁed easement holder from improperly terminating or modifying a
conservation easement. To date, the IRS has not argued that improper easement
termination or modiﬁcation by a land trust disqualiﬁes it as a holder of deductible
easements. However, the provision appears to provide a legitimate basis for the
IRS to do so.

C. Summary
The foregoing are some of the principal common law and statutory provisions
that currently govern the creation, termination and modiﬁcation of conservation
easements. These rules constitute substantial remedies and disincentives to the
improper termination or modiﬁcation of conservation easements. The next
section describes and discusses an alternative, or at least supplemental, approach to
controlling the improper termination or modiﬁcation of conservation easements:
the charitable trust doctrine. The charitable trust doctrine, more commonly
the doctrine of cy pres, has recently been advocated as a needed new control on
improper easement termination and modiﬁcation.

IV. CONSERVATION EASEMENTS AND THE DOCTRINE OF CY PRES
A. The Doctrine of Cy Pres Described
In recent years application of the doctrine of “cy pres” to conservation
easements has been advocated. An argument has been prominently made that

142

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-19-304 (2007).

143

19 C.J.S. Corporations § 676.

144

Supra note 140.

145

26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-14(c)(1) (2007).
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a conservation easement donor makes a “cy pres” bargain with the public. The
bargain is described as one in which the donor of a perpetual conservation
easement is allowed to exercise “dead hand control” over his or her land through
the imposition of the easement in exchange for which privilege the donor is
deemed to have agreed that the easement may be modiﬁed or terminated to meet
future unforeseen circumstances according to the rules of the doctrine of cy pres.146
This argument has not gone without criticism.147
A number of authorities have also recently given support to the application
of the cy pres doctrine to conservation easements. The drafters of the Uniform
Trust Code (“UTC”) state that “the creation and transfer of an easement for
conservation or preservation purposes will frequently create a charitable trust.”148
The Restatement (Third) of Property also recommends that a form of cy pres be
applied to conservation easements.149 As recently as February 2007 the Executive
Committee of the NCCUSL amended the comments to the UCEA to advocate
application of the charitable trust doctrine to conservation easement modiﬁcation
and termination.150
146

McLaughlin, supra note 7, at 459.

147

For example, see Andrew C. Dana, Conservation Easement Terminations, Property Rights,
and the Public Interest, draft prepared for “Advanced Legal Roundtable on Extinguishment of
Conservation Easements” (2005), Land Trust Alliance National Rally, Madison Wisconsin, October
15, 2005 (cited with permission and copy in author’s ﬁles) [hereafter Conservation Easement
Terminations]; see also Andrew C. Dana, Conservation Easement Amendments: A View from the Field
(2006) available at www.learningcenter/lta.org (copy in author’s ﬁles).
148

See comment to UTC § 4, paragraph 5. The complete paragraph states:
Even though not accompanied by the usual trappings of a trust, the creation and
transfer of an easement for conservation or preservation will frequently create a
charitable trust. The organization to whom the easement was conveyed will be
deemed to be acting as trustee of what will ostensibly appear to be a contractual or
property arrangement. Because of the ﬁduciary obligation imposed, the termination
or substantial modiﬁcation of the easement by the “trustee” could constitute a
breach of trust. The drafters of the Uniform Trust Code concluded that easements
for conservation or preservation are sufﬁciently different from the typical cash and
securities found in small trusts that they should be excluded from this section, and
subsection (d) so provides. Most creators of such easements, it was surmised, would
prefer that the easement be continued unchanged even if the easement, and hence
the trust, has a relatively low market value.

Note that the drafters provide no foundation for the statement that creation and transfer of
conservation easements frequently create a charitable trust; the author found no basis for such a
conclusive statement in the research undertaken in preparation for this article.
149

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY § 7.11 (2000).

150

UCEA § 3, comment, was amended by adding the following:
The Act does not directly address the application of charitable trust principles to
conservation easements because: (i) the Act has the relatively narrow purpose of
sweeping away certain common law impediments that might otherwise undermine
a conservation easement’s validity, and researching the law relating to charitable
trusts and how such law would apply to conservation easements in each state was
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The Regulations contemplate that a deductible conservation easement can be
judicially extinguished in the event of an “unexpected change in circumstances”
that “make impossible or impractical the continued use of the property for
conservation purposes” and dictates the manner in which proceeds resulting from
such an extinguishment must be used, unless state law provides differently. 151
In the Hicks case, the Meadowood Easement not only incorporated152 the
provisions required by the Regulations153 it also required application of the
doctrine of cy pres to locate a new holder in the event that the original easement
holder ceased to exist.154 Clearly, at least one party to the Easement had cy pres in
mind in executing the conveyance. Relying on the Wyoming case of Town of Cody
v. Buffalo Bill Memorial Association,155 the district court in the Hicks case applied
the charitable trust doctrine to the termination of the Meadowood Easement and,
the application of the doctrine being challenged on appeal to the Supreme Court
of Wyoming by neither party, that Court adopted the doctrine as the rule of the
case.
beyond the scope of the drafting committee’s charge, and (ii) the Act is intended
to be placed the real property law of adopting states and states generally would not
permit charitable trust law to be addressed in the real property provisions of their
state codes. However, because conservation easements are conveyed to governmental
bodies and charitable organizations to be held and enforced for a speciﬁc public or
charitable purpose—i.e., the protection of the land encumbered by the easement for
one or more conservation or preservation purposes—the existing case and state law
of adopting states as it relates to the enforcement of charitable trust should apply to
conservation easements.
Thus, while Section 2(a) [of the UCEA] provides that a conservation easement may
be modiﬁed or terminated ‘in the same manner as other easements,’ the governmental
body or charitable organization holding a conservation easement, in its capacity as
trustee, may be prohibited from agreeing to terminate the easement (or modify it
in contravention of its purpose) without ﬁrst obtaining court approval in a cy pres
proceeding. [Referencing McLaughlin, supra note 7 and infra note 194.].
151

26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(i) (2007) provides:
If a subsequent unexpected change in the conditions surrounding the property that
is the subject of a donation under this paragraph can make impossible or impractical
the continued use of the property for conservation purposes, the conservation
purpose can nonetheless be treated as protected in perpetuity if the restrictions are
extinguished by judicial proceeding and all of the donee’s proceeds (determined
under paragraph (g)(6)(ii) of this section) from a subsequent sale or exchange of
the property are used by the donee organization in a manner consistent with the
conservation purposes of the original contribution.

26 C.F.R. §1.170A-14(g)(6)(ii) (2007) sets forth a formula for reimbursing a land trust if
a conservation easement is terminated, but speciﬁcally recognizes that State law may direct that
proceeds be applied in a manner other than the formula contained in the Treasury Regulations.
152

The Deed and Easement § 9(b).

153

26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-14(c)(2) (2007).

154

The Deed and Easement § 9(a).

155

Town of Cody v. Buffalo Bill Memorial Ass’n, 196 P.2d 369 (Wyo. 1948).
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The doctrine of cy pres has been described as follows:
If property is given in trust to be applied to a particular charitable
purpose, and it is or becomes impossible or impracticable or
illegal to carry out the particular purpose, and if the settlor
manifested a more general intention to devote the property to
charitable purposes, the trust will not fail but the court will direct
the application of the property to some charitable purpose which
falls within the general charitable intention of the settlor.156
The term ‘cy pres’ is taken from the Norman French phrase ‘cy
pres comme possible’ meaning ‘as near as possible,’ or ‘as near as
may be.’
[C]y pres is applicable in situations where: (1) property is given
in trust for a particular charitable purpose; (2) it is, or becomes,
impossible, impracticable, or illegal to carry out such purpose;
and (3) the settlor manifested a more general intention to devote
the property to charitable purpose.
The doctrine of cy pres is a simple rule of judicial construction,
designed to aid the court to ascertain and carry out, as nearly
as may be, the intention of the donor when that intent
cannot be effectuated to the letter of the donor’s directions or
speciﬁcations.157
However, the doctrine of cy pres applies to the law governing charitable trusts,158
which makes the doctrine part of the law of trusts. Conservation easements are
governed by the law pertaining to easements,159 which is property law.
An additional hurdle to application of the cy pres doctrine to conservation
easements is the requirement of trust law that a trust exist, i.e. that someone
entrusts certain property to another, as trustee, to hold for the beneﬁt of another;160
and that the person creating the trust intends that the creation of the trust to be

156

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 (1959).

157

88 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D 469 § 2 (2007). (citations omitted).

158

Id. at § 5.

159

UCEA § 2.

160

See, e.g., Scotti’s Drive In Restaurants, Inc. v. Mile High Dart In Corp., 526 P.2d 1193,
1196 (Wyo. 1974).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2008

35

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 8 [2008], No. 1, Art. 2

60

WYOMING LAW REVIEW

Vol. 8

for “general charitable purposes” as opposed to speciﬁc and limited charitable
purposes.161 However, the courts generally favor a ﬁnding of general charitable
purpose, and a speciﬁc and limited purpose will only be found when the evidence
is “clear, deﬁnite, and unambiguous.”162 Furthermore, the Restatement (Third) of
Trusts favors ﬁnding of a general charitable purpose.163
Construing a conservation easement as containing a general charitable
purpose is dealt with at length in “Rethinking the Perpetual Nature of Conservation
Easements.”164 Finally, the UTC, enacted in Wyoming, provides for application of
the doctrine of cy pres in any case where the speciﬁc purpose of a charitable trust
cannot be accomplished.165 The comment to the UTC suggests that this provision
supersedes the traditional requirement that a charitable trust express a general
charitable purpose to be subject to cy pres:
Under Section 413(a), a trust failing to state a general charitable
purpose does not fail upon failure of the particular means
speciﬁed in the terms of the trust. The court must instead apply
the trust property in a manner consistent with the settlor’s
charitable purposes to the extent they can be ascertained.166
An even bigger hurdle to ﬁnding that the conveyance of a conservation easement
creates a charitable trust is the requirement that for a trust to exist there must be
a clear intention on the part of the putative settlor to create a trust. The UTC
provides:

161

See, e.g., 88 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D 469 § 16 (2007):
The courts have repeatedly stated that cy pres can be applied only where the donor
had a general charitable purpose and not where the gift was intended for a particular
purpose only. The ultimate question is whether the donor would have preferred
that his gift or bequest be applied to a like charitable purpose in the event that
his original scheme did not work or would have instead desired that the funds be
diverted to private use. (citation omitted).

162

Id.

163

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67, comment b states:
Contrary intention of settlor. Just as it is against the policy of the trust law to permit
wasteful or seriously inefﬁcient use of resources dedicated to charity, trust law also
favors an interpretation that would sustain a charitable trust and avoid the return
of the trust property to the settlor or successors in interest. See § 28, Comment a.
Accordingly, when the particular purpose of a charitable trust fails, in whole or in
part, the rule of this Section makes the cy pres power applicable (thus presuming the
existence of what is often called a general charitable purpose) unless the terms of the
trust (deﬁned in § 4) express a contrary intention (emphasis added).

164

McLaughlin, supra note 7, at 480.

165

UTC § 413(a); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-414(a) (2007).

166

UTC § 413(a), comment.
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(a) A trust is created only if:
(2) the settlor indicates an intention to create the trust;167
As noted, supra notes 146-47 (and accompanying text), some have argued
that the grantor of a conservation easement makes a cy pres bargain with the public
that allows the grantor to control the use of land in future generations through the
terms of the easement.168 However, it is likely that most conservation easement
donors would be surprised to learn that they have made a bargain with anyone but
the organization or agency to which they granted the easement.
Unless landowners manifest a clear and unambiguous intention
to convey restricted rights (as opposed to limited rights) in land
through their conservation easement donations, there is no legal
or equitable basis to conclude that the donors struck a cy pres
bargain with the public, triggering equitable review by the courts
when easement terminations arise.169
Negotiation of the terms of most conservation easements are the exclusive
province of the landowner granting the easement and the prospective holder of
the easement (with the IRS being an invisible third-party).170 Many easement
donors are quite particular about who holds their conservation easement, and
insert provisions that restrict the manner in which an easement may be transferred
in the future. The notion that the conservation easement that they have negotiated
with a speciﬁc land trust constitutes a trust the beneﬁciaries of which are the
general public would be startling to many easement donors.

167
UTC § 402(a)(2); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-403(a)(2) (2007) (emphasis added). The
comment to UTC § 402(a)(2) states:

[S]ubsection (a) codiﬁes the basic requirements for the creation of a trust. To create
a valid trust, the settlor must indicate an intention to create a trust. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS Section 13 (Tentative Draft No. 1, approved 1996); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS Section 23 (1959). But only such manifestations of intent as
are admissible as proof in a judicial proceeding may be considered.
168

See McLaughlin, supra note 7, at 430.

169

Dana, supra note 147, at 15.

170

Where grant funds have been used in purchasing a conservation easement the grantor of
the funds may also require that certain provisions be included in the grant to insure protection of
its interest in the use of the funds. Of course in purchased easement situations, the application of
the charitable trust doctrine becomes even more complicated because the easement was not created
with exclusively charitable intentions so the existence of the “general charitable intent” necessary to
create a charitable trust in a conservation easement is even more dubious.
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Nevertheless, it seems clear that if a court chooses to apply the doctrine of cy
pres to a conservation easement, there is likely to be sufﬁcient legal basis for it to
do so. On the other hand, given the actual fact easement donors are likely to deed
their easement contribution to constitute a charitable trust for the public at large,
courts may ﬁnd it equally justiﬁable to ﬁnd that charitable trust principles and the
cy pres doctrine should not apply to the contribution of conservation easements.
The important question therefore is whether application of the cy pres doctrine to
conservation easements is needed, or prudent, in the long run.
To evaluate this question requires consideration of several issues. First, how
serious is the problem of improper termination or modiﬁcation of conservation
easements? Second, is there a demonstrated lack of remedies for and disincentives
to engaging in improper easement termination or modiﬁcation? Third, is the
doctrine of cy pres a suitable alternative, or addition to, existing remedies?
This article takes the position that there is scant evidence of a current serious
problem of improper easement termination or modiﬁcation in the United States
today, and that the existing remedies and disincentives are adequate, or at least
have not yet proven inadequate, to deal with the problem. The author relies on
dearth of evidence to support a contrary position on these two points in making
them. This leaves the question of whether the doctrine of cy pres is an appropriate
alternative, or supplement on to the law governing conservation easements; which
is a question that will be examined next.

B. Implications of the Application of Cy Pres to Conservation Easements
1. Elimination of Land Trust Authority to Modify or Terminate
Conservation Easements
One of the most profound consequences of applying the doctrine of cy pres to
conservation easements is that such application denies the holder of the easement
the right to terminate or modify a conservation easement on their own. The
Wyoming Supreme Court in the Town of Cody case171 quotes favorably from 2
Bogert,172 Trusts and Trustees § 435 as follows:
In the absence of special provisions in the trust instrument, the
trustees have no power of their own motion to decide that it has
become impossible or inexpedient to carry out the trust as originally
planned and then to substitute another scheme. If the trustees feel

171

Town of Cody, 196 P.2d at 378.

Ronald Chester, George Gleason Bogert & George Taylor Bogert, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND
TRUSTEES (3d ed. 2005).
172
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that an emergency of this type has arisen, they should bring the
situation to the attention of the court and ask for instructions.
(emphasis added).
King and Fairfax also note: “if the easement is in fact a charitable trust, neither
the land trust nor the fee holder, but only the court can modify a CE purpose.”173
Taking control over the modiﬁcation, in particular, of conservation easements
would represent an enormous change from current land trust practice and from
the expectations of most easement grantors and holders.174

2. Expansion of Standing to Enforce Conservation Easements
At common law the only person with standing to enforce an easement was
the holder of the easement. The owner of the servient parcel would also have
standing to prevent abuse of the easement, and to seek termination or modiﬁcation
under one or more of the rules described immediately following. Application
of the cy pres doctrine could expand standing to enforce conservation easements
considerably beyond the holder of the easement and owner of the parcel servient
to the easement.175 In considering this possible expansion of standing, it must be
borne in mind that standing to enforce is, essentially, standing to “second guess”
173
Mary Ann King and Sally K. Fairfax, Public Accountability and Conservation Easements:
Learning from the Uniform Conservation Easement Act Debates, 46 NAT. RESOURCES J. 65,110
(2006).
174

While voluntary termination of a conservation easement is a very rare event, modiﬁcation of
conservation easements occurs frequently enough that the Land Trust Alliance is developing a formal
policy to guide the nation’s land trusts in the practice. Many land trusts around the country have
themselves adopted formal internal policies governing the modiﬁcation of conservation easements.
The subject of easement modiﬁcation is the subject of frequent lectures for landowners, attorneys
and land trust professionals around the country.
Most conservation easement amendment policies that have been adopted by land
trusts permit amendments under the following circumstances:
• To correct clerical or scriveners’ errors in original drafting;
• To fulﬁll prior agreements speciﬁed in the conservation easement;
• To clarify an ambiguities [sic] in the conservation easement;
• To address condemnation proceedings by a public agency; and
• To add restrictions that strengthen the resource protection of the easement.
Dana, supra note 147, at 4.
175

See supra note 155 for an example of the extent to which the Wyoming Supreme Court
has permitted standing to enforce a public trust. However, standing to enforce charitable trusts
traditionally has been quite restricted by the courts; see, e.g., Reid Kress Weisbord, Reservations
About Donor Standing: Should the Law Allow Charitable Donors to Reserve the Right to Enforce a Gift
Restriction?, 42 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 245, 247 (2007): The general rule in charitable trust law,
subject to a few notable exceptions, is that all parties except the state attorney general are prohibited
from bringing suit to enforce the terms of a charitable gift. (citation omitted). However, Weisbrod
acknowledges that, in response to pressure from donors, courts are beginning to expand standing.
Id.; see also McLaughlin, infra note 194, at 1080 (regarding limited standing).
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the decisions of a land trust and landowner that result in the termination, or any
modiﬁcation, of a conservation easement.
Cases have found that standing under the cy pres doctrine is sufﬁciently
broad to include the attorney general of the state in which the trust is established;
designated or ascertained beneﬁciaries of the trust; and, in some cases, donors
to or founders of, the trust in question, but typically not mere taxpayers or
members of the public who may enjoy the beneﬁts of the trust.176
The UTC recognizes the attorney general as having “the rights of a qualiﬁed
beneﬁciary with respect to a charitable trust having its principal place of
administration in this state by notifying the trustee by written notice.”177 The
UTC, and its Wyoming counterpart, also recognizes the settlor of a charitable
trust as having standing to enforce the trust.178 “Settlor” includes not only the
creator of the trust, but anyone contributing to the trust.179 Thus, as applied to a
land trust, the founders of the land trust would have standing to invoke cy pres as
well as anyone contributing to the trust, at least for purposes of enforcing the trust
with respect to that contribution.

176
Supra note 157, at § 8. Recall that the district court, in its initial ruling in Hicks (later
abandoned), held that anyone who was a citizen of Wyoming had standing to seek to enforce the
Scenic Preserve Trust in that case. Supra note 38. Such an expansion was rejected by the Wyoming
Supreme Court in Hicks, 157 P.3d 914, 920 (Wyo. 2007) (citing Mitchellville Cmty. Ctr., Inc. v.
Vos (In re Clement Trust), 679 N.W.2d 31, 37 (Iowa 2004)):

It is well established that persons are not entitled to sue [to enforce a charitable trust]
if their only beneﬁt from enforcement of the trust is that shared by other members
of the public. The community’s interest in the enforcement of a charitable trust
must be vindicated by the attorney general.
UTC § 110(d); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-110(d) (2007). Note: notiﬁcation of the trustee is
only found in the Wyoming law.
177

178

UTC § 405(c); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-406(c) (2007).

UTC § 103; WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-103 (2007). In reading the comments to the UTC it
is not clear that the drafters were considering the consequences of applying cy pres to conservation
easements:
179

The deﬁnition of ‘settlor’ (paragraph (15)) refers to the person who creates, or
contributes property to, a trust, whether by will, self-declaration, transfer of
property to another person as trustee, or exercise of a power of appointment. For the
requirements for creating a trust, see Section 401. Determining the identity of the
‘settlor’ is usually not an issue. The same person will both sign the trust instrument
and fund the trust. Ascertaining the identity of the settlor becomes more difﬁcult
when more than one person signs the trust instrument or funds the trust. The fact
that a person is designated as the ‘settlor’ by the terms of the trust is not necessarily
determinative. For example, the person who executes the trust instrument may be
acting as the agent for the person who will be funding the trust. In that case, the
person funding the trust, and not the person signing the trust instrument, will be
the settlor. Should more than one person contribute to a trust, all of the contributors
will ordinarily be treated as settlors in proportion to their respective contributions,
regardless of which one signed the trust instrument.
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Typically, a land trust is organized by incorporators, who may, or may not,
have any functional interest in the land trust (e.g., an incorporator may be an
attorney hired to form the corporation that becomes the land trust). More likely,
the initial ofﬁcers and directors would be a closer equivalent of a typical trust
settlor, but it is not clear that these people actually “created” the land trust.
Furthermore, it is at least arguable that a signiﬁcant contributor early in the
history of a land trust has standing to invoke cy pres, not only with respect to the
original contribution, but also with respect to assets that may have resulted from
the contribution. Application of the doctrine of cy pres to a land trust, according
to the provisions of the UTC, would signiﬁcantly expand standing to invoke cy
pres to enforce a conservation easement.
The Wyoming Supreme Court in Hicks comprehensively explored the
question of who has standing to enforce a charitable trust. The Court reviewed
a number of authorities, including The Law of Trusts and Trustees,180 which the
Court cited favorably for the following proposition with respect to standing to
enforce a charitable trust:
Recently, the common law standing rule has expanded. ‘[A]s
public attention to laxity in the enforcement by the Attorney
General increases, courts have begun to expand standing to
enforce charitable trusts’ to others. Chester, et al., The Law of
Trusts and Trustees, § 411, at 2. Generally, that power has been
extended to individuals with a ﬁduciary interest (trustees, former
and subsequent trustees, or subtrustees); to specially interested
beneﬁciaries; and to the settlors and their successors. Id., at
§ 412–415; see also Forest Guardians v. Powell, 24 P3d 803, 808
(N.M.App. 2001).181
Following this line of reasoning, possible persons with standing to invoke cy
pres to enforce a conservation easement would include (i) the attorney general,
(ii) the settlors of the land trust; (iii) the successors of the settlors (including the
original ofﬁcers and board members and their successors in a land trust); (iv)
trustees past, (v) present and (vi) future (virtually, all board members of land
trusts); and (vii) “specially interested” beneﬁciaries (a new class).
The Wyoming Court concluded that a “qualiﬁed beneﬁciary” “means
a beneﬁciary who is currently entitled to distributions of income or principal
from the trust or has a vested remainder interest in the residuary of the trust
which is not subject to divestment.”182 The Court also concluded that the term

180

Chester, Bogert & Bogert, supra note 172.

181

Hicks, 157 P.3d at 920.

182

Id. at 921 (citing WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-110(d)(xv) (2007)).
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“qualiﬁed beneﬁciary” was analogous to the common-law concept of “specially
interested.”183 In both cases, the concept limits the standing of beneﬁciaries of
a charitable trust to beneﬁciaries who have been singled out by the trust, either
as individuals, or as a class of persons, to receive a beneﬁt different from that
available to the public at large.184 The typical conservation easement does not
single out individuals, or classes of individuals, as beneﬁciaries. While neighbors
may derive a special beneﬁt from the protection of adjoining land, it would be
hard to consider them as having been intentionally granted a special beneﬁt from
a conservation easement.
A typical charitable trust does not impose a burden on real property, other
than by outright ownership when full fee title has been passed to the trustee, or
perhaps by holding a traditional easement over real property as an appurtenance
to real property that it owns outright. Therefore, it is not clear whether the owner
of a parcel of land servient to a conservation easement has any standing under
the doctrine of cy pres. Such a person would certainly seem to have a “special
interest” in the charitable trust to which his or her land is subject. However,
the sense of “qualiﬁed” or “special” as described above speaks only to beneﬁts
derived from a charitable trust. The owner of a parcel servient to a conservation
easement typically does not derive a “beneﬁt” from the conservation easement;
the restrictions imposed on his or her use of the land sound much more like a
detriment.
Under the common law applicable to easements the owner of the servient
parcel clearly has standing in matters pertaining to the easement to which his
property is subject. Presuming that the cy pres doctrine , if applied, would not
replace, but only supplements, the common law governing conservation easements,
application of the doctrine should leave intact the servient parcel owner’s standing
under common law property principles with respect to the conservation easement
to which his or her parcel is subject. Where neighbors contemporaneously convey
conservation easements on their adjoining properties each might be considered a
“qualiﬁed beneﬁciary” by reason of having a “special interest” in the easement on
the others’ property.185
In any event, it is clear that applying the doctrine of cy pres expands signiﬁcantly
the number of persons with standing to enforce a conservation easement. This,
in turn, will complicate the enforcement of conservation easements because
enforcement may involve multiple parties and the attendant increase in the time
and cost of litigation. The foregoing discussion suggests that applying the cy pres
doctrine to conservation easements may open standing to challenge decisions
183

Hicks, 157 P.3d at 921.

184

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28, comment c.

185

Note that if these easements were conveyed pursuant to an agreement between the neighbors
the tax deductibility of the conveyances would be suspect.
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to modify or terminate a conservation easement to (i) the attorney general, (ii)
the grantor of the easement, (iii) the grantor’s successors, (iv) the founders of
the holder of the easement (including ofﬁcers and board members) and their
successors, (v) anyone who can demonstrate a “special interest” in enforcement of
the easement and, (vi) under the original common law applicable to easements,
the owner of the parcel servient to the conservation easement.

3. Changing the Criteria for Modiﬁcation and Termination of
Conservation Easements
In addition to changing the authority of the holder of a conservation
easement to modify or terminate the easement as it sees ﬁt (taking into account
the constraints on such decisions imposed by common law and statutory law
described supra beginning at note 70); and vesting standing to challenge easement
modiﬁcations or terminations in a potentially broad range of new persons;
application of the cy pres doctrine to conservation easements would also alter the
criteria for the modiﬁcation or termination of a conservation easement.
The UTC does not spell out the criteria for application of the doctrine of
cy pres other than to state: “the court may apply cy pres to modify or terminate
the trust by directing that the trust property be applied or distributed, in whole
or in part, in a manner consistent with the settlor’s charitable purposes.”186 The
Restatement (Third) of Trusts describes the circumstances which trigger application
of the doctrine as those in which carrying out the purpose of the trust becomes
(1) unlawful; (2) impossible; (3) impractical; (4) or wasteful.187 A more expansive
view of circumstances justifying application of cy pres is provided by Am. Jur. Proof
of Facts:
The cy pres doctrine cannot be invoked until it is clearly established
that the directions of the donor cannot, or cannot beneﬁcially,
be carried into effect. (citation omitted) . . . A purpose becomes
impracticable when the application of property to such purpose
would not accomplish the general charitable intention of the
settlor.188
As easements, conservation easements have been seen primarily as two-party
contracts189 in which modiﬁcations could cover a broad range of issues. Such issues
include the correction of technical errors in the easement document; clariﬁcation
186

UTC § 414(a)(iii); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-415(a)(iii) (2007).

187

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67.

188

88 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D 469 § 10 (2007) (citations omitted).

189

Mary Ann King and Sally K. Fairfax, Public Accountability and Conservation Easements:
Learning from the Uniform Conservation Easement Act Debates, 46 NAT. RESOURCES J. 65, 85
(2006).
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of ambiguities; tightening of restrictions; expansion of the area covered by the
easement190; relocation or modiﬁcation of reserved development rights; increase
in reserved rights in exchange for increased conservation on the easement parcel
or another parcel; and modiﬁcations to reﬂect changes in the law, or to improve
enforcement and management of the easement.
The doctrines of cy pres and administrative deviation or equitable deviation191
would preclude most of these amendments because these doctrines only permit
revisions in the substantive or administrative terms of a charitable trust in
the event of an unforeseen change in circumstances that make unlawful,
impossible, or impractical192 achieving the purpose of the trust.193 Few typical
conservation easement amendments could meet any of these criteria, although a
leading advocate of application of the cy pres doctrine suggests that it would be
appropriate to imply a reserved right in all conservation easements to amend the
easement for most of the purposes listed in the preceding paragraph.194 How this
190
In the author’s opinion, placing additional acreage under conservation easement should
be done by conveyance of a new conservation easement rather than amendment of an existing one
because expanding an easement requires conveyance of an interest in the previously unburdened
property, and typical amendment provisions lack the necessary terminology to constitute a
conveyance. Nevertheless, many organizations expand existing conservation easement by amendment
of an existing easement.
191
A doctrine parallel to cy pres in which a court may permit deviation from the administrative
terms of a charitable trust if, due to unforeseen circumstances, adherence to such terms would
frustrate the accomplishment of the purpose of the trust. See McLaughlin, supra note 7, at 433; see
also 88 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D 469 § 7 (2007).
192

88 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D 469 § 7 (2007).

193

McLaughlin, supra note 7, at 435-36, describes the effect of the application of the doctrine
of cy pres as follows:
Except to the extent granted the power in the deed of conveyance, the holder
of a donated easement should not be permitted to agree with the owner of the
encumbered land to modify or terminate the easement unless and until: (i)
compliance with one or more of the administrative terms of the easement threatens
to defeat or substantially impair the conservation purposes of the easement, and a
court applies the doctrine of administrative deviation to authorize the modiﬁcation
or deletion of such term or terms, or (ii) the charitable purpose of the easement has
become impossible or impracticable due to changed conditions, and a court applies
the doctrine of cy pres to authorize either a change in the conservation purpose for
which the encumbered land is protected, or the extinguishment of the easement,
the sale of the land, and the use of the proceeds attributable to the easement to
accomplish the donor’s speciﬁed conservation purpose or purposes in some other
manner or location.
In other words, if the easement grantor is well-enough represented to provide an amendment
clause in his or her conservation easement, the easement will be exempt from the doctrine of cy
pres; otherwise not. One has to wonder; if application of the doctrine is so crucial to the proper
management of conservation easements having a clever lawyer should exempt a grantor from its
application.
194

Nancy A. McLaughlin, Amending Perpetual Conservation Easements: The Myrtle Grove
Controversy, 40 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW 1031, 1075 (2006).
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implied reserved right to amend conservation easements would be reconciled in
actual practice with the cy pres doctrines, is hard to predict, or even understand,
being as it is the modiﬁcation of what is so far legal theory with yet another
theory.

4. Increased Costs
Finally, applying the doctrine of cy pres to easement terminations and
modiﬁcations will signiﬁcantly increase the time, money, and effort involved in
such actions over that involved under current common law practices.195

5. Summary 196
To summarize: application of the doctrine of cy pres to conservation easements
can reasonably be expected to have the following consequences:
1. It will eliminate the authority of easement holders to modify
or terminate conservation easements.
2. It may signiﬁcantly expand the number of persons with
standing to invoke cy pres in decisions to modify or terminate
conservation easements (standing to prevent modiﬁcation or
termination and, presumably, standing to initiate modiﬁcation
or termination).
3. It will impose a new and restrictive set of criteria on the
justiﬁcations for easement modiﬁcation or termination
precluding most of the easement amendments that are typical
today.
4. It will dramatically increase the time, money and costs of
easement termination and modiﬁcation.

195
Dana, supra note 147, at 16, provides several elaborate examples and concludes: “[t]he
transactions costs that are associated with any administrative deviation or cy pres proceedings,
whether simple or complex, are likely to be signiﬁcant.” In at least one suit with which the author is
familiar seeking to enforce a conservation easement in Wyoming (settled out of court), the attorney’s
fees for the land trust involved exceeded $260,000 for pre-trial expenses alone. That case involved
three years of pre-trial work and never went to trial. It is not known how much was expended in
legal fees and court costs in the Hicks case. It is known that the suit was ﬁled in 2003, not decided
by the district court until 2005, and not decided by the Supreme Court until 2007.
196
For an extensive analysis of the potential problems associated with the application of the
doctrine of cy pres to conservation easements. See Dana, supra note 147.
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V. HICKS V. DOWD REVISITED
The termination of the Meadowood Easement may appear to some as a
“poster child” example of the need for application of the doctrine of cy pres to
conservation easements. As of the time of this writing, whether the Wyoming
Attorney General will respond to the Supreme Court’s invitation to enforce the
Meadowood Easement is purely a matter of speculation, and seems increasingly
unlikely as time passes. However, it may be instructive to consider the Hicks case in
the context of the common law and then in the context of the cy pres doctrine.

A. Application of Existing Remedies
As discussed, supra, the common law of easements is, by statute in Wyoming,
applicable to easement modiﬁcations or terminations.197 Applying common law
principles to the Hicks case suggests that Johnson County and the Dowds may
have been within their rights to terminate the Meadowood Easement, because
the common law clearly allows the holder of an easement (Johnson County, in
this case) to “release” the easement back to the owner of the servient parcel (the
Dowds).198 The parties, arguably, also had a right to terminate the Meadowood
Easement under the common law principles applicable to the termination of
easements due to “cessation of purpose”199 because of the unforeseen development
of coalbed methane on the Ranch, and its alleged effect upon the purpose of the
Meadowood Easement.200
One caveat to the argument that the parties to the Meadowood Easement
could, between them, release that Easement is that, at common law, a release is
only effective as to those with an ownership interest in the dominant estate who
agree to the release.201 However, unless the courts found that the Meadowood
Easement had been granted to, or expressly for, the beneﬁt of others in addition
to Johnson County, the release should be within the rights of the County and
197

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34-1-202(a) (2007); See also text accompanying supra note 95.

198

See the discussion of “release,” supra note 77 and text accompanying note 77. Note that
neither of the parties to the Hicks suit, (and neither of the courts considering the suit) appeared to
consider this line of reasoning which clearly suggests that, in this case of ﬁrst impression, no one was
thinking of the conservation easement in the common law terms that seem dictated by the nature
of the Easement and the terms of the Act.
199

See the discussion of “cessation of purpose,” supra note 76 and text accompanying note

200

See Resolution 247, supra note 32:

76.
WHEREAS, the coalbed methane development, which is not subject to the
Conservation Easement, is and will be in the future inconsistent with the purposes
of the Conservation Easement, makes enforcement of the Conservation Easement
impossible as to the coalbed methane development and exposes the Board to liability
under the terms of the Conservation Easement.
201

Supra note 78.
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the Dowds.202 An argument to the contrary would be that the release of the
Meadowood Easement by the Trust was ultra vires and/or against public policy (see
the discussion of ultra vires, supra notes 140-44 and accompanying text), keeping
in mind that the Trust was a corporation governed by its own organizational
documents and technically separate from Johnson County.
Had the release of the Meadowood Easement been to “disqualiﬁed persons”
the transaction would be an “excess beneﬁt transaction” within the meaning of
the Internal Revenue Code. If the transaction were an excess beneﬁt transaction
the Dowds could reasonably expect to be required to “correct” the transaction by
conveying to the Trust a conservation easement comparable to the Meadowood
Easement, and re-conveying the One-Acre Tract to the Trust. In addition, the
Dowds would be facing an excise tax in an amount equal to 25% of the value of
the Meadowood Easement and the One-Acre Tract.203 In addition, the trustees of
the Trust might expect to pay up to $20,000 each in excise taxes. This assumes
that it is determined that the value of the Dowd’s agreement “to indemnify and
hold harmless the Board and the County from all liability, claims and causes of
action, including reasonable costs and attorneys fees, that arise out of or by virtue
of transfer of the One Acre Tract and Conservation Easement to them”204 was
less valuable than the ﬁnancial beneﬁt conferred on the Dowds by release of the
Meadowood Easement and conveyance of the One-Acre Tract.205

202

Of course, this was the ﬁnding implicit in the district court’s ruling that the Scenic Preserve
Trust was a charitable trust and the action was one to enforce that Trust. This position does not take
into account constitutional, legal, or moral constraints on the County as a result of its governmental
status.
203
In certain cases where an excess beneﬁt transaction is “corrected” the excise tax may be
abated. 26 C.F.R. § 53.4958-1(c)(2)(iii) (2007).
204

Supra note 32.

205

Releasing restrictions on the future development and subdivision of the 1,043-acre
Meadowood Ranch conferred an unequivocal and substantial beneﬁt to the Dowds. In this case
we do not know that value was. We do know that the Lowham Limited Partnership obtained an
independent valuation of the Meadowood Easement at the time of the conveyance to the County,
indicating that the value of the easement was $1,266,000; and we know that the Partnership claimed
a federal tax deduction for the easement. Presumably, six years later the value of the Meadowood
Easement would be the same as or greater than it was when contributed. It is true that by terminating
the Meadowood Easement the County averted liability, whatever that may have been, from holding
an interest in land on which coalbed methane operations were likely to occur. Regardless of how
likely it is that merely holding a conservation easement exposes the holder to liability for activity on
the servient parcel, whatever the value of this beneﬁt to the County might have been, it clearly was
not consideration provided by the Dowds for the beneﬁt the Dowds received, and therefore does
not enter into the excess beneﬁt evaluation. What the value of being indemniﬁed and held harmless
from challenges to the release of the Meadowood Easement itself might be is hard to measure,
although the Dowd’s agreement in this regard does constitute for the termination of the easement.
It is not known whether the Dowds covered the County’s legal fees and expenses in defending the
Hicks suit pursuant to the indemniﬁcation agreement.
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However, the Dowds do not appear to be “disqualiﬁed persons.” They did
not make the contribution of the Meadowood Easement to the County or the
Trust; the Lowham Partnership did that. Even if the deductible value of the
Meadowood Easement were considered as the contribution value for purposes
of determining whether the grantor was a substantial contributor, and therefore
a disqualiﬁed person, the contribution would not be attributable to the Dowds.
Assuming that the Dowds were not disqualiﬁed persons for some other reason
(and given the government-afﬁliated nature of the Trust, it is doubtful that the
Dowds were substantial contributors, board members, ofﬁcers, etc.) being owner
of land servient to a Trust-held conservation easement does not by itself make
them disqualiﬁed persons. Furthermore, as the Dowds were not the contributors
of the Meadowood Easement and did not, therefore, claim a tax deduction with
respect to the contribution, they will not be subject to the tax beneﬁt rule.206
The only potential penalty under existing common or statutory law would
appear to be the potential for revocation of the Trust’s exempt status. However,
as the Trust is a government-afﬁliated organization, even if this extraordinary
remedy were to be used by the IRS, it is unlikely to be of signiﬁcant consequence
to Johnson County which can always create and fund an equivalent organization.
Furthermore, the requirement for disclosure of easement terminations and
modiﬁcations on Form 990 did not apply to the year in which the Trust
terminated the Easement and, because the Trust is exempt from ﬁling Form 990
as a government-afﬁliated organization, even if the requirement did apply in the
year of the termination, it would not apply to the Trust. Therefore, except for the
notoriety of the Hicks case itself, there is no reason why the IRS would learn of
the termination of the Meadowood Easement.
For the foregoing reasons it does not appear that, under the existing common
law or statutory rules applicable to conservation easements, there is likely to
be any consequence seriously adverse to either the County or the landowner
as a result of the termination of the Meadowood Easement. Assuming that the
termination of the Meadowood Easement was improper, there is no penalty for
the action, no deterrence to similar actions by the Trust or the County in the
future, and no disincentive to others. Such results lend considerable weight to
the argument that there is a need for the application of the doctrine of cy pres, or
some other mechanism of public oversight, for a discussion of some legislative and
administrative alternatives to cy pres), for conservation easement terminations.

206

Nash v. U.S., 398 U.S. 1, 3 (1970). Because the Lowham Partnership did not enjoy the
beneﬁt of the easement release, it is not subject to this rule either.
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B. Application of the Doctrine of Cy Pres
Now let us consider how the doctrine of cy pres would affect the termination
of the Meadowood Easement. There are two important threshold issues before
actual application of cy pres can occur: the court must determine that a charitable
trust exists, which depends upon the intention of the putative settlor; second,
someone with standing must bring an action to enforce the charitable trust.
Considering the standing issue ﬁrst; granted that the doctrine of cy pres may
expand standing rather signiﬁcantly over that existing with respect to enforcement
of a traditional easement, it is still problematic, as discovered by Mr. Hicks, the
plaintiff in the Hicks case. In principle, the issue of whether or not a charitable
trust was created seems more of a challenge with respect to conservation easements.
A court must ﬁnd a clear intention on the part of the grantor of a conservation
easement (the “settlor” of the charitable trust, if there is any) to create a trust. A
charitable trust depends upon the existence of a contribution from the settlor to
another person who agrees to hold that contribution for the beneﬁt of one or more
other persons. If, instead of contributing a conservation easement, the settlor had
given land outright to a land trust, with restrictions on the future use of that land,
the ﬁrst condition to ﬁnding creation of a charitable trust would exist: a restricted
gift. However, the donor of a conservation easement merely grants a land trust the
right to enforce restrictions on the future use of land, not a fee interest subject to
restrictions. The restrictions themselves are the gift.
For a charitable trust to arise with respect to donated property,
including conservation easements, the gift of property must be
‘restricted.’ [Citation omitted.] Therefore, if a gift of a conservation
easement does not constitute a restricted gift of a partial interest
in real property, a charitable trust does not arise, either explicitly
or as a matter of law. In such circumstances, there is no legal
justiﬁcation for grafting charitable trust common law principles
on to conservation easements created pursuant to statute.207
A large part of the problem of determining whether the contribution of a
conservation easement constitutes the creation of a charitable trust goes back to
the elusive nature of a conservation easement itself. It is not property that can,
in any normal sense of the word, be “used.” Therefore, the notion of restricting
the use of a conservation easement, i.e. restricting the use of a restriction, seems
perverse. However, a conservation easement certainly represents a right held by a
land trust. Clearly, the grantor of that right, or set of rights, intends that the rights

207

Andrew Dana, Conservation Easements: A View from the Field, p. 7, published by the Land
Trust Alliance on LTA Net.org (http://www.ltanet.org/objects/view.acs?object_id=18640) (2006)
(emphasis in original).
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be used in a certain way (i.e. according to the typically elaborate provisions of the
easement document) and for the beneﬁt of the public (if any intent to gain tax
beneﬁts is part of the donor’s motivation). Following this line of thinking, a court
could ﬁnd that a conservation easement is granted subject to the “restriction” that
the terms of the easement be enforced in perpetuity for the beneﬁt of the public.
This would seem to be the essence of the requirements of the Code for deductible
easements and consistent with the terms of most easements. Such intent also
constitutes the essence of what it takes to create a charitable trust. Of course, these
“restrictions” are not imposed on the donation unilaterally by the donor. They are
required by federal tax law. Accordingly, one can argue about whether the donor
really made a classic restricted charitable gift, imposing the donor’s own preferences
and restrictions on the land trust, or whether the donor simply sought to follow
the requirements of the tax code to be eligible to claim a charitable donation.
If these threshold issues can be successfully addressed, application of the
doctrine of cy pres itself involves three steps.208 The ﬁrst step involves a judicial
determination that the conservation purposes of the conservation easement are
unlawful, impractical, or impossible due to unforeseen changed conditions.209
In Hicks, the unforeseen circumstance was coalbed methane development.
Arguably, based upon the geological report prepared for the Lowham Partnership
indicating that “the probability of mining on the property was so remote as to be
negligible”210 coalbed methane development was unforeseeable despite the fact that
minerals were owned separately from the surface at the time that the Meadowood
Easement was conveyed.
Whether coalbed methane development rendered the conservation purposes
“unlawful, impractical, impossible, or wasteful” is less clear. The “Purpose” deﬁned
in the Meadowood Easement was to: “preserve and protect in perpetuity the natural,
agricultural, ecological, wildlife habitat, open space, scenic and aesthetic features
and values of the Ranch.”211 Coalbed methane development certainly doesn’t render
the conservation purposes of the Easement unlawful. It also would not appear that
such development makes the conservation purposes wasteful.212 Whether coalbed
methane made achieving the purpose of the Meadowood Easement impractical or
208
McLaughlin, supra note 7, at 464. The three-stop process described above is an adaptation
of McLaughlin’s.
209

See supra note 193 and accompanying text.

210

Brief of Appellees Dowd at 7, Hicks v. Dowd, 157 P.3d 914 (Wyo. 2007).

211

Meadowood Easement, ¶ 1, p. 2.

212

This raises an interesting question. If the Meadowood Easement were able to prevent
coalbed methane development on the Ranch, and that development was determined to be highly
valuable economically, could a court, applying the doctrine of cy pres, determine that the purpose of
the Meadowood Easement to keep the land open was “wasteful” and therefore a ground upon which
the easement could be terminated, or at least modiﬁed to allow the development? These kinds of
questions are the kinds that make application of cy pres both intriguing and unsettling.
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impossible would require a substantial and complicated factual inquiry into the
nature, extent, duration and likelihood of such development. Arguably, many of
the conservation purposes, e.g. protection of the agricultural and habitat uses of
the Ranch, could still be achieved in spite of coalbed methane development. A
good argument could be made that termination of the Meadowood Easement
so early in the development process was premature as it would be impossible,
with just over one acre of land disturbed by such development,213 to ascertain the
true extent or permanence of damage to the values which it is the purpose of the
Easement to protect.214
The question of impossibility or impracticality will be determined as a
function of how a court weighs the conﬂicting variables involved. The district
court had several alternatives under cy pres. It could have determined that coalbed
methane did not make impossible or impractical the conservation purposes of the
Meadowood Easement and set aside the termination. The district court could have
determined that coalbed methane development made impossible enforcement of
the Meadowood Easement’s prohibition against mining and mineral extraction215
and simply directed modiﬁcation of the Easement to remove that speciﬁc
prohibition.216 Or, the district court could have determined that the conservation
purposes of the Meadowood Easement could no longer be achieved and uphold the
termination. The Meadowood Easement also contained the standard “severance”
clause (paragraph 12(b)) allowing valid portions of the Easement to stand while
others could be invalidated. This provision also provided the parties and the
court an alternative to the termination of the entire interest. If the district court
determined that the conservation purposes of the Meadowood Easement had
become impossible or impractical due to coalbed methane development its next
step under the doctrine would be to determine whether or not the contributor
of the Meadowood Easement, the Lowham Partnership, had a “general charitable
intent” in conveying the Easement, or a limited or speciﬁc intent.217
As noted supra courts are reluctant to ﬁnd a lack of general charitable intent in
determining whether or not to apply cy pres. The UTC, applicable in Wyoming,
provides that unless expressly stated to the contrary, a general charitable intent will
213
Afﬁdavit of Kenneth M. Quinn, supra note 31, at page 4. The afﬁdavit also states that the
area disturbed was 0.79 acres.
214

As noted id, at the time of the release of the Meadowood Easement around one acre of the
Ranch had been disturbed by coalbed methane development.
215

Meadowood Easement, ¶ 5(d), p. 6.

216

Such an action would be so narrow in scope as to belie the argument that coalbed methane
development made impossible or impractical achieving the conservation purposes, in which case cy
pres would appear to have no application. However, the parallel doctrine of administrative deviation,
supra note 191, could apply for the narrow purpose of eliminating a prohibition that could no
longer be administered (although, the mineral rights having been severed prior to conveyance the
Meadowood Easement, that provision could never have been administered).
217

Supra note 161, and accompanying text.
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be implied in the creation of any charitable trust.218 Finally, when a landowner
contributes a conservation easement pursuant to the requirements of the Code, he
or she must include a provision in the easement that insures that, in the event that
the easement is terminated for any reason in the future, the holder of the easement
is entitled to a percentage of the sales proceeds of the underlying property equal
to the value of the easement.219 Unless state law provides otherwise (which it does
not in Wyoming), these proceeds are required to be used in a manner “consistent
with the conservation purposes” of the easement.220 This provides a fairly solid
basis for ﬁnding that the contribution of a conservation easement evidences a
“general charitable intent” on the part of the donor. Here again, however, it may
be argued that the donor only intended to comply with federal tax law in order
to obtain a charitable deduction, rather than having the broader charitable intent
necessary to create a trust.
Assuming that the district court found a general charitable intent, coupled
with its determination that coalbed methane development made impossible or
impractical achieving the purposes of the Meadowood Easement, the district
court could apply cy pres to either modify the Meadowood Easement so that it
continued to serve a conservation purpose, or the district court could authorize
sale of the Ranch and direct that the portion of the proceeds attributable to the
Meadowood Easement, calculated as required in the Easement, be turned over to
the Trust for use consistent with the purposes of the Easement, as provided for
therein.221
The number of variables involved in the Hicks case (the multiple and
comprehensive conservation purposes of the Meadowood Easement; the extent
and character of the Ranch itself; the relatively speculative impact of coal bed
methane development on the Ranch and conservation values protected by the
Meadowood Easement), and the extensive discretion of the district court in the
application of cy pres to those variables, makes the results of the application of
cy pres to the Hicks case unpredictable. However, it is clear that cy pres provides
remedies that do not exist under existing common and statutory law, given
the particular facts of the case that preclude application of these common and
statutory law remedies.

218

UTC § 405(b), WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-406(b) (2007).

219

26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(ii) (2007).

220

26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(i) (2007).

221

Presumably, the district court would be guided, if not bound, by the contractual agreement
of the parties to the Meadowood Easement with respect to the use of proceeds in the event the
Meadowood Easement is terminated and the Ranch sold, as required by the Code. This raises the
question of what happens if the owner of the land servient to the easement does not chose to sell that
land. Could a court enforce a partition of the land between the servient parcel and the easement by
requiring a sale and division of the proceeds, or would it impose a constructive trust on the land as
requested in the Hicks case?

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol8/iss1/2

52

Lindstrom: Hicks v. Dowd: The End of Perpetuity

2008

HICKS V. DOWD AND CONSERVATION EASEMENTS

77

VI. THE NEED FOR NEW REMEDIES
The central question raised by the Hicks case, and the prospect of future
improper easement terminations and modiﬁcations, is whether an additional
tool, such as the doctrine of cy pres, is needed. Hicks is a case where the application
of cy pres could have made a difference. Given the outstanding invitation by the
Wyoming Supreme Court to the Attorney General, it still may play a role, however
unpredictable a role it may be.
However, certain facts of the Hicks case make it less than an ideal example for
testing the efﬁcacy of existing common law and statutory remedies in discouraging
improper easement termination or modiﬁcation. First, the Hicks case involved
an easement held by a government-afﬁliated land trust. That close afﬁliation is
underscored by the County Board’s occasional failure to recognize the Trust as
an independent entity.222 Second, the Dowds were not the original grantors of
the Meadowood Easement. Third, the Dowds do not appear to be “disqualiﬁed
persons,” so that the conveyance of the One-Acre Tract and termination of the
Meadowood Easement do not invoke the prohibition against “excess beneﬁt
transactions.” For these reasons, the signiﬁcant disincentives to improper
easement termination or modiﬁcation under existing common and statutory law
were largely irrelevant.
Had the holder of the Meadowood Easement been a private land trust
dependent upon direct public support, managed by people whose primary
purpose was land conservation, and whose existence depended upon its continued
exempt status, as is typically the case of private land trusts; had the Dowds been
“disqualiﬁed persons” making the transaction an “excess beneﬁt transaction” in
which the beneﬁciary of the transaction was potentially liable for the “correction”
of the transaction and payment of a 25% excise tax on the excess beneﬁt as well
as the possibility of, in effect, returning the tax beneﬁts received as a result of
the easement deduction, the outcome of the termination would likely be quite
different.
Thus, in a case where improper easement termination or modiﬁcation
constitutes an “excess beneﬁt transaction” it is likely that the existing tax penalties
are both adequate and compelling remedies and disincentives to improper actions.
Furthermore, where the easement holder is a private land trust required to report
easement termination and modiﬁcations annually to the IRS on Form 990, and
222
There seemed to be confusion as to who exactly held the Meadowood Easement. The
Easement was granted directly to the Board in 1993. In 1997 the Board conveyed the Easement to
the Trust. In 2002 the Board, in Resolution 245, acknowledged receipt of the Easement and OneAcre Tract but failed to note the conveyance to the Trust. The Resolution authorized the Board, not
the Trust (although it technically held the Easement), to convey the One-Acre Tract and release the
Easement to the Dowds, in exchange for the Dowds agreement to indemnify and hold-harmless the
Board and County from liability for these actions.
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heavily dependent upon its exempt status and the goodwill of its contributors for
its continued existence, improper easement termination or modiﬁcation raises
risks that should deter all but the most clueless land trusts from such activity.
Assuming knowledge223 of these very real consequences on the part of land
trusts and owners of land servient to conservation easements; given the heightened
scrutiny of easement transactions by the IRS;224 and given the dearth of evidence
of improper easement termination or modiﬁcation to date, there is every reason
to believe that the existing penalties for improper easement termination or
modiﬁcation will prove sufﬁcient deterrents to improper actions in the kinds of
cases to which they apply: private land trusts dealing with disqualiﬁed persons.
This covers a vast number of conservation easements in the United States.
Given the intensive educational efforts directed at private land trusts; the
dearth of evidence of improper easement terminations or modiﬁcations; the new
reporting requirements imposed on private land trusts by Form 990; and the
dramatically increased scrutiny of the IRS, it would seem premature, at best, to
encourage across-the-board application of the doctrine of cy pres to conservation
easements. This is not to say that cy pres might not be an appropriate remedy in
certain cases, including Hicks; provided that it can be applied without opening up
the entire ﬁeld of conservation easement administration to cy pres. However, before
introducing the cy pres doctrine the ﬁeld of property law that is the foundation of
conservation easements, careful consideration of some of the short-comings of cy
pres in the context of conservation easements should be considered.225
As discussed, supra at notes 171–90 (and accompanying text), application of
the doctrine of cy pres to conservation easements is likely to have the following
consequences: (1) It will eliminate the discretion of land trusts to terminate or
modify easements; (2) it may signiﬁcantly expand the number and types of persons
who may intervene in decisions to modify or terminate easements; (3) it will
223
Knowledge of consequences is the key to compliance. Education of land trusts and landowners
is, therefore, a crucial element in preventing improper easement termination and modiﬁcation. The
national effort being mounted by the Land Trust Alliance, and others, to insure that private land
trusts are aware of the consequences of improper easement termination and modiﬁcation, and to
establish a national certiﬁcation program for land trusts, will play an important role in making the
consequences of improper easement termination or modiﬁcation effective.
224
The IRS reports having over 500 conservation easements under audit, or pre-audit, and
most of the land trusts in Colorado are themselves being audited due to the Colorado tax credit.
225
These shortcomings have been addressed by one of the chief proponents of application of
the doctrine of cy pres who has devoted considerable thought to mitigating these shortcomings;
McLaughlin, supra note 7. However, the kinds of analysis, balancing of factors, and insight required
by McLaughlin’s suggested mitigations assumes a judiciary far more knowledgeable, patient, and
sympathetic to nuance, and with substantial time to devote to application of the doctrine, than is
likely to be the case. As an academic matter it is certainly possible to think one’s way around the
logical pitfalls of application of the doctrine. However, the reality is that these pitfalls are far more
likely to be fallen into than avoided in the actual application of the doctrine.
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signiﬁcantly constrain the circumstances in which easements may be terminated
or modiﬁed, and dramatically reduce the types of modiﬁcations that can be
considered; and (4) it will signiﬁcantly increase the time, resources, and money
that must be invested in undertaking easement terminations or modiﬁcations by
land trusts, landowners, and courts.
Addressing these consequences in order:
(1) Application of cy pres to conservation easements does not simply create a
new remedy for correcting improper easement terminations or modiﬁcations; it
imposes an entire new process on the administration of conservation easements,
whether that administration is improper or not. Every modiﬁcation and
termination will be subject to the process because no termination or modiﬁcation
that has not been judicially sanctioned will be valid.
It has been suggested that the right to undertake proper easement modiﬁcations
(and presumably terminations) should be considered to be “implied” in the
easement itself.226 However, if cy pres is applied to conservation easements, it requires
a signiﬁcant leap of faith to assume that the application will be so discriminating as
to imply authority for certain types of amendments, but not others. Furthermore,
whether or not authority is “implied” for certain modiﬁcations, for example, is
unlikely to be so crystal clear that either landowners or land trusts can simply
assume that such authority is implied, particularly given the cast of characters
granted standing by the doctrine to second-guess their assumptions. Once the
application of cy pres to conservation easements becomes accepted, it would be
reasonable to assume that mere “due diligence” would strongly suggest judicial
review of every signiﬁcant easement modiﬁcation of whatever nature, and every
termination.
It is overly sanguine to assume that imposition of this new burden on
easement modiﬁcations, at least, will not discourage landowners from contributing
conservation easements in the future. While it is unlikely that most easement
donors make the contribution assuming that some day they will need to terminate
the easement, it is unrealistic to assume that they believe they have created the
perfect document that will not require revision with experience.
Most conservation easement donors understand that they must give up the
unilateral right to revise a conservation easement in order for the contribution of
the easement to qualify for a tax deduction. However, it has been reasonable for
landowners to assume that reasonable requests for easement modiﬁcation will
be favorably considered by land trusts, and that land trusts have the authority to
make such modiﬁcations. The assumption is given foundation by the LTA’s own
Standards and Practices manual which provides guidance to the nation’s land trusts
226

McLaughlin, supra note 195, at 1075.
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with respect to easement amendments, and the Tax Court case of Strasburg v.
C.I.R. (T.C. Memo. 2000-94 (2000)) in which that Court recognized an easement
amendment which added land to an existing easement.
It is unreasonable to assume that landowners will take the same comfort from
application of a doctrine that says that only if the purpose of their conservation
easement has become impractical or impossible to accomplish can a modiﬁcation
be considered and then only through a judicial process that may involve
participation by the attorney general, former land trust board members and the
original easement donor, for example.
(2) Assuming that opening up standing to “enforce” a conservation easement
to the attorney general, as well as others, is a positive change fails to recognize that
such persons may argue for the termination or modiﬁcation of a conservation
easement, not just against such termination or modiﬁcation. What is to prevent
a development-minded attorney general from ﬁling suit seeking to apply cy pres to
terminate an easement in a case where a developer seeks to construct, say, a new
shopping center on easement land that the developer argues will strengthen the tax
base and reduce unemployment?227 What is to prevent a judge, whose background
is in commercial real estate law, from agreeing with the attorney general (and likely
the owner of the land servient to the easement) that continuing to enforce the
easement constitutes a “waste” that justiﬁes termination of the easement under cy
pres; or that the increased value of the easement property for the shopping center
represents a “changed circumstance” making accomplishment of the purposes of
the easement “impractical?” What is to keep the judge from agreeing that the
value of the easement, in such a case, is based upon the agricultural value of
the land, instead of its development value, therefore allowing only a pittance of
compensation to go to the land trust?228 In such cases application of cy pres could
actually undermine the integrity of conservation easements.
227
See Dana, supra note 147, at 20 (Many state attorney general ofﬁces have far higher priorities
than overseeing conservation easements, and many do not have staff sufﬁcient to represent the
interest of the public in such proceedings. One state attorney general asked the author why it was
safe to assume that an attorney general would necessarily be favorably inclined to land protection
and not actively opposed in a cy pres proceeding and why, therefore, the precedent should be set in
the ﬁrst place.).
228

See Dana, supra note 147, at 18, 20:
The broad equitable powers of judges to amend conservation easements for widely
divergent reasons in similar circumstances will not lead to predictability and stability
in conservation easement amendment law. Instead, the result is more likely to be a
patchwork of decisions based on each judges’ predilections and preferences, or the
parties’ practical settlement of controversies before a judicial decision is reached.
(Footnote omitted). The lack of predictability and reliability that is inherent to
charitable trust proceedings may result in profound social demoralization costs, as the
public, conservation easement donors, and easement holders ﬁnd that conservation
easement enforcement decisions turn on individual judges’ idiosyncrasies, not on
a set of clearly deﬁned criteria that are designed to protect the interest of all parties.
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While it has rightly been said that opening up standing to every citizen to
bring a cy pres action would expose charities to “unnecessary litigation”229 limiting
standing to trust settlors, the attorney general, or qualiﬁed beneﬁciaries,230 does
not preclude “unnecessary litigation” and puts land trusts in the potential position
of having to look over their shoulders for challenges from past board members,
ofﬁcers, easement contributors, and the attorney general, all of whom may have
agendas disruptive to the proper administration of conservation easements.
(3) While it may be appropriate to limit easement terminations to cases in
which the purposes of a conservation easement, due to unforeseen circumstances,
have become impractical or impossible to accomplish,231 such a limitation imposed
upon easement modiﬁcations, unless the existence of “implied powers,” supra, is
assumed, could preclude many salutary and reasonable easement modiﬁcations,
even after a judicial review, simply because the preconditions for the application
of cy pres are absent.232 Of course, under the guise of cy pres a court may assume
authority to do a number of things, whether or not they are consistent with the
theory of cy pres. Whether the ﬂexibility thus derived from an equitable proceeding
should be more a source of comfort than concern will be more dependent upon
the judge assigned to the case than the theory of the doctrine itself.
(4) As anyone who has engaged in litigation of any complexity can testify, it
is costly and time consuming. Imposing these costs on land trusts in the interest
of preventing improper easement termination or modiﬁcation, particularly given
the dearth of evidence of such improper actions, is difﬁcult to justify. Land trusts
today are struggling to put together sufﬁcient funds to enforce the conservation
easements that they hold in case of violation. To impose substantial additional
costs on the administration of easements will divert assets that may be needed for
enforcement and normal protection and stewardship functions, again weakening,
rather than strengthening, the integrity of conservation easements.
By necessity, judges are generalists; they are not experts, for example, at understanding
the diffuse beneﬁts provided by ecosystem services, or wildlife habitat, or open-space
land protection. Understanding foregone short-term economic opportunities (lost
revenues, lost jobs, etc.) is much easier—and provides a more expeditious basis on
which to make decisions—than understanding the value to society of protecting
habitat for butterﬂies. Complicated, time-consuming arguments, based on extensive
scientiﬁc testimony, that the purposes of a conservation easement have not become
impossible or impracticable are unlikely to be well received by many judges, with
crowded criminal and civil dockets.
229

Chester, Bogert & Bogert, supra note 172.

230

Hicks v. Dowd, 157 P.3d 914, 921-22 (Wyo. 2007). See also discussion at § B-2, supra.

231

Which still leaves open the question of whether and when it is appropriate to terminate a
conservation easement because its purpose has become “wasteful.”
232
One of the arguments for applying the doctrine of cy pres is to justify the “dead hand
control” allegedly imposed on land use decisions by conservation easements. See McLaughlin, supra
note 7, at 459. Ironically, application of cy pres to conservation easements, rather than making
easements more ﬂexible, may make them more rigid. See, Dana, supra note 147, at 23.
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A land trust cannot avoid litigation costs simply by refusing to consider any
easement terminations or modiﬁcations. With sufﬁcient incentive any number
of persons with standing under the doctrine could institute a cy pres proceeding
to pursue a termination or modiﬁcation. In such a case, the land trust could
save money by simply declining to participate actively; although this would not
be consistent with its obligation to enforce its easements or necessarily with the
interests of conservation.
In considering litigation costs, it would be well to recognize that the doctrine
of cy pres may represent a sword in the hands of landowners and developers, not
just a shield for conservation interests. As the value of development potential tied
up by conservation easements increases in the future, the incentive for landowners
(and contract purchasers from landowners, who would also presumably stand in
the shoes of the landowner for purposes of standing) to institute cy pres actions
to modify or terminate conservation easements, will increase. In the hands of a
well-ﬁnanced legal team the doctrine of cy pres could be stood on its head and
used equally well to obtain desired modiﬁcations or terminations as to prevent
them. The mere cost of defending such suits may compel settlements that are not
in the best interests of conservation.
For all of these reasons appropriating the doctrine of cy pres to conservation
easements appears a risky proposition. Furthermore, the doctrine cannot reach
(assuming its application remains limited to charitable contributions of easements)
a great many conservation easements that are sold for fair value, are exacted as part
of development approvals by localities, or conveyed as mitigation under state or
federal laws. Such easements represent an increasing body of land conservation
and the issues relating to the termination or modiﬁcation of these easements are
not signiﬁcantly different from those relating to contributed easements.

VII. RECOMMENDATION
It is suggested here that, rather than grafting a body of law developed with
respect to an entirely different type of transaction, the creation of a charitable
trust, certain modiﬁcations be made to the existing law applicable to improper
easement modiﬁcation or termination more effective. Two such changes would go
far to avoid the results seen in the Hicks case, and would extend current remedies
to most conservation easement modiﬁcations and terminations, whether or not
the easements were charitably contributed.
First, the deﬁnition of “disqualiﬁed persons” that currently restricts
application of the prohibition against “excess beneﬁt transactions” to “insiders”
should be eliminated and the prohibition should be extended to anyone engaging
in transactions resulting in either private inurement or private beneﬁt. Given the
current congressional focus on conservation easements, this revision of the law
could be limited to transactions involving conservation easements.
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Second, governmental agencies and government-afﬁliated agencies, at least
with respect to conservation easements held by them, should be considered
the same as any other “qualiﬁed organization” within the meaning of section
170(h)(3) of the Code for purposes of applying the excess beneﬁt transaction
prohibition, and penalties, or such agencies and afﬁliated organizations should no
longer be considered “qualiﬁed organizations” for purposes holding conservation
easements.
Making these changes will effectively provide remedies for the improper
modiﬁcation or termination of virtually all conservation easements, whether
they were granted with charitable intent or not. This is because the excess beneﬁt
prohibitions would apply whether or not an easement was granted out of charitable
motives.
The additional virtue of the two preceding suggestions is that these changes,
once enacted, would automatically apply uniformly throughout the United States,
whereas the doctrine of cy pres is a common law concept that must be developed
and applied state-by-state with the possibility of little consistency or predictability.
It will take many years for application of the doctrine of cy pres to make its way
into the laws of most states, whereas revising application of the excess beneﬁt
prohibition can be done by an act of Congress (not guaranteed to be quicker, it is
conceded).

VIII. CONCLUSION
It is conceded that current common and statutory law applicable to
conservation easements does not provide a comprehensive response to improper
easement terminations or modiﬁcations. However, it is the conclusion of this
article that incorporating the doctrine of cy pres is an inappropriate response to
what thus far has been so minor a problem as to be nearly theoretical. Under
current circumstances, it makes sense to allow recent changes in reporting
requirements for private land trusts and landowners to have time to take effect,
and for the current vigorous efforts of the IRS to investigate easement transactions
to have a chance to educate both the land trust community and the IRS.
Furthermore, serious consideration should be given to expanding the reach of the
prohibition against excess beneﬁt transactions instead of extending the doctrine
of cy pres to conservation easements. The penalties for violating that prohibition
are compelling and directly address what will be the principal motivation for
improper easement termination or modiﬁcation in the future: ﬁnancial gain.
Finally, expanding an existing and effective penalty on improper transactions will
be far less disruptive of the important and constructive relationship between land
trusts and landowners, far less intrusive into proper easement administration,
and far less likely to discourage future easement contributions, than injecting an
entirely new and additional process into existing easement administration.
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